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WHERE IS CONCUSSION LITIGATION HEADED?
THE IMPACT OF RIDDELL, INC. V. SCHUTT SPORTS,
INC. ON BRAIN INJURY LAW
CAILYN M. REILLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Concussions are no joke; they are deadly.1  They lead to cogni-
tive problems, physiological brain damage, and physical and emo-
tional disorders.2  But concussions are the reality of contact sports.3
And contact sports, such as football, are not going anywhere.4
* Managing Editor of Student Works, Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol.
XX; J.D. Candidate, Villanova University School of Law, May 2013; B.A., 2007, Col-
gate University.
1. See Reeves Wiedeman, The Sporting Scene: Football in Hell, THE NEW YORKER,
Nov. 21, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/sportingscene/2011/
11/football-in-hell.html (describing physical magnitude of “what football’s really
like”); Michelle D. McGrit, Do Universities Have a Special Duty of Care to Protect Stu-
dent-Athletes from Injury?, 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 219, 219 (1999) (describing
omnipresent risk of injury or death when participating in sports); see also Alan
Schwarz, Helmet Design Absorbs Shock in a New Way, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/27/sports/football/27helmets.html?page
wanted=all [hereinafter Schwarz 10/27/07] (reporting concussion effects “can
range from persistent memory problems and depression to coma and death”).
2. See Malcolm Gladwell, Offensive Play; How different are dogfighting and foot-
ball?, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 19, 2009, at 50, available at http://www.newyorker.
com/reporting/2009/10/19/091019fa_fact_gladwell (explaining Doctors Bennett
Omalu, Ann McKee, and Robert Cantu’s findings of physiological effect on brain,
called chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE), that results from multiple head
impacts).
3. See McGrit, supra note 1 at 219-20 (describing risk of participation in sports R
as something that “anyone who has watched or participated in sports knows”); see
also Gerard T. Noce & Frans J. von Kaenel, Individual and Institutional Liability for
Injuries Arising From Sports and Athletics: Participants, Coaches, Clubs and Schools May
Incur Liability for Sports-Related Injuries, But Different Standards Apply, 63 DEF. COUNS.
J. 517 (1996) (“Participation in sports is inherently dangerous . . . .  Physical con-
tact is a fundamental and sanctioned component of many sports.”); see also Richard
Obert, Suffering the Sideline Injuries Are More Than Dealing With Pain, THE ARIZ. RE-
PUBLIC, Nov. 14, 1997, at C11 (“Physical injuries, such as concussions and broken
bones, are an unavoidable risk in any sport.”).
4. See Mike Wise, Super Bowl 2012: Football coaches and players need to get health
issues through their heads, WASH. POST. (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/sports/redskins/super-bowl-2012-football-coaches-and-players-need-to-get-
health-issues-through-their-heads/2012/01/31/gIQAbnPziQ_story.html (propos-
ing culture change in football).
(517)
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Thus, the question remains: what can be done?5  The answer is
unclear.6  Although steps have been taken to educate players, par-
ents, and coaching staff about the dangers of concussions—and cer-
tain rule changes and state legislation have decreased the
opportunity for concussions to occur during play—concussions,
nevertheless, continue to occur.7  The answer is not to eliminate
contact sports.8  This is America; what a travesty an autumn week-
end would be without the anticipation of a football game.9
Various measures have been proposed to make the game of
football safer.10  In addition to rule changes, these include more
disciplined forms of contact, education, and better screening and
post-play testing.11  Some of these measures are already in place in
5. See Jorge Castillo, College Athlete Died of Head Trauma, Father Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/sports/ncaafootball/col-
lege-football-player-died-from-head-trauma-father-says.html (asking that “some-
thing . . . be made better, through education or equipment or whatever . . .” to
protect others following death of son from concussive hit).
6. See Brittany Sauser, The Search For a Safer Helmet, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Jan.
26, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/27126/?a=f (referring
to attempts to protect against concussions through better equipment and conclud-
ing, “frankly, I don’t think people know which way to go at this point”; quoting
Chris Nowinski, president of Sports Legacy Institute).  For a further discussion of
Nowinski’s involvement in concussion research, see infra notes 94-96 and accompa- R
nying text.
7. See, e.g., H.R. 1347, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010) (seeking to create and
implement new guidelines for the prevention and treatment of concussions in
school-aged children); see also Jorge Castillo, An Ordinary Football Game, Then A
Player Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/
sports/seemingly-ordinary-football-game-then-a-player-dies.html (“As those who
play football learn new ways to improve safety—through training, medical re-
sponse, and equipment—sometimes they are left to contemplate this: brains re-
main vulnerable, and even the most ordinary collisions on the field can kill.”); see
also Alan Schwarz, Senator Calls for Helmet Safety Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2011, at A5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/04/sports/football/04
helmets.html [hereinafter Schwarz 1/4/11] (“The estimated 500,000 concussions
sustained annually by [athletes under 18 who play organized football] have be-
come a pressing health concern in football across the United States, leading to
rule changes and state legislation . . . .”).
8. See, e.g., KJ Dell’Antonia, Motherlode, Adventures in Parenting: Football and the
Fear of Concussions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2012, 1:24 PM) http://parenting.blogs.
nytimes.com/tag/concussions/  (“NFL touch football will not revolutionize the
game.  If you’re going to play football . . . you have to accept that it’s always going
to be a rough sport.”).
9. See id. (“[F]ootball is special, both because of the hits and because of the
history – in this country, it’s easy to find generations of football players watch-
ing . . . .  We love our football, urban and rural . . . .”).
10. See Sauser, supra note 6 (condoning NFL’s attempts to protect against con- R
cussions through better awareness, equipment, and rules).
11. See id. (describing “significant rule changes” enacted in 2010-2011 season
in response to “greater awareness of head injuries,” including more serious penal-
ties and fines for helmet-to-helmet and defenseless player hits).
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many youth, collegiate, and professional leagues, but concussions,
ostensibly, have only increased.12  Many proposals focus on equip-
ment changes.13
In football, the three leading helmet makers, Riddell, Inc.
(“Riddell”), Schutt Sports, Inc. (“Schutt”), and Adams U.S.A., have
competed with each other in a way that has benefited the ever-grow-
ing body of concerned football helmet purchasers.14  These compa-
nies have competed to produce football helmets that purportedly
lower the risk of concussions.15  Riddell was the first to advertise
and market one such helmet, which it called the Revolution.16  The
Revolution model, introduced in 2002, was the first football helmet
designed for “concussion resistance.”17  In 2003, Schutt introduced
12. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.190 (West 2009) (providing
Washington State concussion and head injury guidelines); see also XENITH ACAD.,
BUILDING THE ENLIGHTENED WARRIOR, at 5 (2009), available at http://www.xenith.
com/mission_control/assets/Uploads/BuildingtheEnlightenedWarrior.pdf (ex-
plaining that increased awareness generally leads to “significant short term in-
crease in diagnoses”). But see Micky Collins et.al., Examining Concussion Rates and
Return to Play in High School Football Players Wearing Newer Helmet Technology: A Three-
Year Prospective Cohort Study, 58 NEUROSURGERY 275, 286 (Feb. 2006) (“Despite mod-
ifications in equipment and rules in football, concussive injury remains a serious
consideration with regard to the well-being of athletes.”).
13. See, e.g., Alan Schwarz, As Injuries Rise, Scant Oversight of Helmet Safety, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/
sports/football/21helmets.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [hereinafter Schwarz 10/
21/10] (expressing exasperation at fact that football helmet research and develop-
ment have yet to determine effective means for preventing concussions in contact
sports: “this has become a serious impediment to making a safer football helmet”).
14. See Schwarz 10/27/07, supra note 1 (“Contemporary helmet manufactur- R
ers have made a point of improving protection against concussions.”); Schwarz 10/
21/10, supra note 13 (“Recent engineering advances made by Riddell, Schutt, Ad- R
ams and other manufacturers have undoubtedly improved the performance of the
football helmet . . . .”).
15. See Shelly Anderson, New Helmet Designs Have Concussions in Mind, PITTS-
BURGH POST-GAZETTE (July 28, 2002), http://old.post-gazette.com/steelers/200207
28helmets0728p4.asp (describing “movement to try to reduce [concussions] in
football through better helmets” from which Riddell and Adams produced Riddell
Revolution and Adams Pro Elite).  Competition among these suppliers of football
equipment has a long history, and is not limited merely to concussion-reduction
technology. See Schutt Manufacturing Co. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 202, 203-04
(7th Cir. 1982) (memorializing storied history of competition between
companies).
16. See Anderson, supra note 15 (introducing Riddell’s helmet, designed to R
reduce incidence of concussion).  Despite its name, critics were skeptical of how
revolutionary the helmet truly was. See id. (demonstrating response to Riddell’s
Revolution anti-concussion claims, stating “the jump to the conclusion that the
Riddell helmet is indeed a revolutionary design is premature”).
17. Gregg Easterbrook, Virginia Tech helmet research crucial, ESPN (July 19,
2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=easterbrook-110719_
virginia_tech_helmet_study&sportCat=nfl.  For a further discussion of Riddell
manufacturing, see infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. R
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its own line of high-end protective products, including the DNA
football helmet, which also purported to protect players through
concussion-reduction cushioning technology.18
In December 2008 Riddell filed a lawsuit against Schutt in the
Western District of Wisconsin.19  In Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt Sports,
Inc.,20 the manufacturer claimed infringement of its jaw flap pat-
ents, false advertising under section 43(a) of the federal Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), trade libel, and product disparagement.21
In response, Schutt brought counterclaims for false advertising
under the Lanham Act, and deceptive trade practices under the
Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act.22  The District Court ad-
dressed the patent infringement claim in a separate opinion.23
This Note focuses on the Court’s decision as to the claims of false
advertising and deceptive trade practices, for which the District
Court ultimately ruled in favor of Riddell, finding that there was
“no evidence that Schutt suffered any injury from those
advertisements.”24
This Note explores the Riddell decision and briefly hypothe-
sizes on how future courts will treat claims of false advertisement
regarding concussions.25  Section II describes the factual and legal
18. See Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 977 (W.D. Wis.
2010) (identifying Schutt’s high-end products); see also Schutt Sports Historical Time-
line, SCHUTT, http://www.schuttsports.com/aspx/general/historytimeline.aspx
(describing timeline of Schutt Sports).  For a further discussion of Schutt manufac-
turing, see infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. R
19. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d. at 966 (introducing cause of action).  For a
further discussion of the lawsuit, see infra notes 47-84 and accompanying text. R
20. 724 F. Supp. 2d 963 (W.D. Wis. 2010).  For a further discussion of Rid-
dell’s claims, see infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text. R
21. See id. at 966 (describing plaintiff’s claims).  For a further discussion of the
elements of false advertising under the Lanham Act, see infra notes 127-167 and R
accompanying text.
22. See id. (providing Schutt’s counterclaims).  Schutt also brought counter-
claims for declaratory judgment of non-infringement, invalidity and inequitable
conduct. See id. (listing other counterclaims).  For a further discussion of Schutt’s
counterclaims, see infra notes 35-54 and accompanying text. R
23. See id. (distinguishing defendant Schutt’s counterclaims for false advertis-
ing and deceptive trade practices and plaintiff Riddell’s patent infringement
claims and noting “[t]hose motions will be addressed in a separate opinion”).  For
a further discussion of the procedural posture of the case, see infra notes 35-54 and R
accompanying text.
24. See id. at 966, 975, 979 (granting Riddell’s motion for partial summary
judgment on Schutt’s counterclaims for false advertising and deceptive trade prac-
tices and finding that Schutt did not provide any evidence to support “a conclusion
that the results or methods of [Riddell’s] concussion study are unreliable” or that
Schutt suffered any harm from Riddell’s advertisements).  For a further discussion
of the District Court’s decision, see infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. R
25. For a further discussion of the court’s decision in Riddell, see infra notes
192-293 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion of the application of this R
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dispositions that fueled the case.26  Section III explores the broader
factual and legal background that led to the case.27  It discusses the
body of scientific findings on concussions, Riddell’s helmet study,
false advertising under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, state legis-
lation on concussions and false statements, and concussion-related
lawsuits.28  Section IV explains the specific counter-claims brought
by the defendant and the holding of the court.29  Specifically, it
discusses the issues of false advertising, the reliability of Riddell’s
study, and injury to the defendant.30
Section V analyzes the reasoning of the court and its applica-
tion to concussion regulation and prevention.31  This section also
analyzes the public policy, and the truthful dissemination of the risk
of concussions from participation in contact sports, regardless of
what studies may show.32  Section VI concludes by explaining the
impact of the case on future concussion-related false advertising
lawsuits.33  There has been much attention given to the issue re-
cently, which has focused on protecting and educating the con-
sumer, and more is undoubtedly to come.34
II. FACTS
The parties to the Riddell case were Riddell and Schutt.  Rid-
dell, the plaintiff, is a brand of Easton-Bell Sports, Inc., which
manufactures and supplies protective sports equipment, including
case to future concussion-related lawsuits and false advertising, see infra notes 362- R
370 and accompanying text. R
26. For a further discussion of the factual and legal background that gener-
ated the claims, see infra notes 85-191 and accompanying text. R
27. For a further discussion of the broader factual and legal background that
led to the case, see infra notes 85-191 and accompanying text. R
28. For a further discussion of the broader factual and legal background that
led to the case, see infra notes 85-191 and accompanying text. R
29. For a further discussion of the counterclaims raised by the defendant and
the court’s analysis, see infra notes 192-293 and accompanying text. R
30. For a further discussion of the District Court’s rationale, see infra notes
192-293 and accompanying text. R
31. For a further discussion of the application of this case to the issue of con-
cussion regulation and prevention, see infra notes 294-359 and accompanying text. R
32. For a further discussion of the application of this case to the issue of con-
cussion regulation and prevention, see infra 294-359 and accompanying text. R
33. For a further discussion of the application of this case to future concus-
sion-related lawsuits and false advertising, see infra notes 362-370 and accompany- R
ing text.
34. For a further discussion of the application of this case to future concus-
sion-related lawsuits and false advertising, see infra notes 362-370 and accompany- R
ing text.
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football gear.35  Riddell is also the official helmet manufacturer of
the NFL.36  Schutt, the defendant, is a competing manufacturer
and supplier of sports equipment and football gear.37  Riddell and
Schutt have historically competed for ninety percent of the market-
place for football helmets.38
In 2002 Riddell introduced the Revolution, a redesigned hel-
met, intended to prevent the incidence of concussions in football.39
The Revolution was described as “slightly larger but lighter” than
previous helmets, with “large ventilation holes along the top.”40  It
also featured a more rounded facemask, intended to “deflect some
hits rather than absorb them,” a feature in previous helmets
thought to contribute to the incidence of concussions.41  The dis-
tinctive feature of the Revolution was its shape, which “swe[pt] back
toward the ear, then jutt[ed] out along the jaw line,” intended to
accommodate for side-impacts, also thought to contribute to
concussions.42
35. See Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 966 (W.D. Wis.
2010) (introducing plaintiff and defendant as manufacturers and sellers of sports
equipment, including football gear); see also Joel Curran, Riddell Wins Patent In-
fringement Suit Against Schutt, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.prnews
wire.com/news-releases/riddell-wins-helmet-patent-infringement-suit-against-
schutt-100335199.html (detailing Riddell, Inc. and parent company Easton-Bell
Sports, Inc.); Schwarz 10/21/10, supra note 13 (providing background on five R
football helmet makers, including Riddell, Schutt, Adams U.S.A, Rawlings, and
Xenith).
36. See Rodd Zolkos, NFL Sued Over Players’ Brain Injuries: Helmet Company Also
Named in Suit Alleging Negligence, BUSINESS INSURANCE (July 24, 2011, 6:00 AM),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20110724/NEWS04/307249980 (not-
ing Riddell is official helmet manufacturer of NFL).
37. See Schwarz 10/21/10, supra note 13 (describing Riddell and Schutt). R
Riddell is the official helmet supplier of the NFL and occupies the largest share of
the overall football helmet market; Schutt occupies a slightly smaller, but highly
competitive, share of the market. See id. (attributing Riddell’s position in market
to its “2002 introduction of its Revolution model, which the company markets ag-
gressively as having features . . . that reduce concussion risk . . . .”).
38. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (situating parties in football economic
market).
39. See Anderson, supra note 15 (announcing introduction of Riddell’s R
Revolution and Adams’ Pro Elite helmets).
40. See id. (detailing Revolution design changes).
41. See id.  The facemask was available, for the first time, in a lighter, titanium
option, as well as the traditional steel. See id. (revealing that titanium option is
more expensive but “much lighter than the standard steel”).
42. See id.  (noting helmet shape was “designed in response to the first scien-
tific study of concussions in football, which found that many concussions are
caused by blows to the jaw and side of the head”).  Differences in the design of the
jaw strap, facemasks, lining, and shell were thought to affect a helmet’s ability to
prevent, or reduce, the risk of concussion. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (stat-
ing differences in design of features in high-stress areas may affect helmet’s ability
to prevent or reduce concussion).  Although Adams’ Pro Elite helmet came to
6
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In 2003 Schutt introduced the DNA football helmet, which was
also designed to reduce the incidence of concussions in football.43
The DNA helmet was the first helmet to implement Schutt’s Ther-
moplastic Urethane (TPU) Cushioning system.44  Schutt continued
to expand its line of high end concussion-reduction helmets and in
2008 it unveiled the ION, “the heir apparent to the DNA Pro.”45
The ION also featured TPU Cushioning and a shock absorbing
faceguard.46
The Riddell action arose from Riddell’s allegations of patent in-
fringement, false advertising, trade libel, and product disparage-
ment against its competitor, Schutt.47  In December 2008, Riddell
filed its complaint in the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Wisconsin.48  The complaint alleged infringement of
Riddell’s jaw flap patents, false advertising under section 43(a) of
the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), trade libel, and prod-
uct disparagement.49  Riddell sought monetary, declaratory, and in-
junctive relief.50
In February 2009 Schutt filed an answer and counterclaims.51
In its defense, Schutt asserted invalidity of Riddell’s patent, non-
market before the results of the concussion study were revealed, it had a similar
shape, and lighter optional titanium facemask. See Anderson, supra note 15 R
(describing Pro Elite: “[i]t mimics the shape of the head, with a curved indenta-
tion in back”).  The rationale for the design change was simple: “it was lighter and
reduced fatigue late in the game.  You want athletes to keep their heads up.  When
they get tired and start dropping their heads, that’s when they become more vul-
nerable to head and spine injuries.” Id.
43. See Schutt Sports Historical Timeline, supra note 18 (providing historical time- R
line of Schutt Sports).
44. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 977 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (identifying Schutt’s
high-end products); see also ION 4D, SCHUTT, http://www.schuttsports.com/aspx/
Sport/ProductCatalog.aspx?id=787 (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (describing Ther-
moplastic Urethane (TPU) Cushioning system, introduced in 2003).
45. See Schutt Sports Historical Timeline, supra note 18 (noting introduction of R
ION4D to market in 2008).
46. See id. (chronicling announcement of ION4D and its special features).
47. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (stating cause of action).  The substance
of Riddell’s patent claim is beyond the scope of this Note, and is discussed in a
separate opinion: Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 981 (W.D. Wis.
2010).  This Note focuses on the court’s opinion and order regarding Riddell’s
motion for summary judgment on Schutt’s counterclaims for false advertising and
deceptive trade practices, as discussed in Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d 693 (W.D. Wis.
2010).
48. See Complaint at 1 Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d 963 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 19, 2008)
(No. 3:08-cv-00711-BBC), 9632008 WL 5596624 (providing complaint).
49. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (reiterating plaintiff’s claims).
50. Id. (stating plaintiff’s requested relief).
51. See Answer at 1 Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d 963 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 16, 2009) (No.
08CV00711), 2009 WL 7985652 (answering complaint and filing counterclaims).
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infringing use of the patent, and inequitable conduct.52  Moreover,
Schutt brought counterclaims for false advertising under the Lan-
ham Act and deceptive trade practices under the Wisconsin Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act.53  Schutt sought a declaratory judgment to
enjoin Riddell from causing further alleged harm.54
In July 2010 the District Court issued an opinion granting Rid-
dell’s motion for partial summary judgment as to Schutt’s counter-
claims for false advertising and deceptive trade practices.55  The
court addressed Riddell’s patent infringement claims in a separate
opinion.56  This Note focuses on the Court’s decision as to the false
advertising and deceptive trade practice issues; accordingly, the pat-
ent issue is not discussed here.57  That decision focused exclusively
on Riddell’s motion for summary judgment on Schutt’s counter-
claims.58  As such, this Note considers only Schutt’s counterclaims
as the claims at issue, and does not discuss Riddell’s claims.
A. Schutt’s Lanham Act Counterclaims
The crux of Schutt’s Lanham Act claim concerned the alleg-
edly false, “misleading safety claims and deceptive practices” that
52. See id. (describing Schutt’s defense).
53. See id. (detailing Schutt’s counterclaims); Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B), 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (stating “[a]ny person who, on or in connection with
any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designa-
tion of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading repre-
sentation of fact, which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by
any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act”).
54. See Answer at 1 Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d 963 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (No.
08CV00711), 2009 WL 7985652 (praying for declaratory judgment relief from al-
leged harm caused by Riddell).
55. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 975, 979 (distinguishing defendant Schutt’s
counterclaims for false advertising and deceptive trade practices and plaintiff Rid-
dell’s patent infringement claims and noting “[t]hose motions will be addressed in
a separate opinion”).
56. See id. at 966 (noting motions related to patent claims “will be addressed
in a separate opinion”).
57. See id. at 966, 975, 979 (granting Riddell’s motion for partial summary
judgment on Schutt’s counterclaims for false advertising and deceptive trade prac-
tices and finding that Schutt did not provide any evidence to support “a conclusion
that the results or methods of [Riddell’s] concussion study are unreliable” or that
Schutt suffered any harm from Riddell’s advertisements).  For a further discussion
of the District Court’s decision, see infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. R
58. See id. at 966 (issuing opinion on “plaintiff’s motion for partial summary
judgment on defendant’s counterclaims for false advertising and deceptive trade
practices”).
8
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Riddell used in advertising its Revolution helmet.59  The objectiona-
ble claims took two forms: (1) non-comparative false establishment
claims, which did not compare Riddell’s helmets to Schutt’s, and
mentioned only the Riddell Study (as defined below); and (2) com-
parative advertisement claims, which explicitly compared Schutt’s
helmets to Riddell’s products.60
The majority of Riddell’s advertisements did not mention
Schutt by name.  Of these non-comparative advertisements, Schutt
objected to four types of statements, which the District Court de-
scribed as: (a) “statements to the effect that ‘research shows a 31-41
percent reduction in concussions in players wearing Riddell Revolu-
59. Section 43(a) provides:
(1) the defendant made a false statement of fact about its product or
another’s product in a commercial advertisement, (2) the statement has a
tendency to deceive or actually deceived a substantial segment of its audi-
ence, (3) the deception is material, that is, it is likely to influence
purchasing decisions, (4) the defendant caused its false statement to
enter interstate commerce, and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be
injured as a result, either by direct diversion of sales from itself to defen-
dant or by a loss of good will that is associated with its products.
Hot Wax, Inc., v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B)) (providing five ele-
ments for proving false advertising under statute); see also Frederic Frommer, AP
NewsBreak: FTC Looking Into Helmet Claims, WASH. POST, (Jan. 14, 2011), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/14/ap-newsbreak-ftc-looking-helmet-
claims/ (describing Federal Trade Commission investigation into Riddell and
Schutt Sports’ “misleading safety claims used in online video advertisements for
helmets”).  The particularly disconcerting marketing claim, the FTC explained,
was a statement on Riddell’s website, which provided: “research shows a 31 percent
reduction in the risk of concussion in players wearing a Riddell Revolution football
helmet when compared to traditional helmets.” Id.  However, according to the
FTC, “there is actually very little scientific evidence to support the claim,” and the
percentage by which the risk is decreased “has been criticized by experts for years.”
Id. (quoting N.M. Senator Tom Udall, who requested FTC investigation into hel-
met manufacturers’ claims); Schwarz 1/4/11, supra note 7 (recalling experts’ criti- R
cisms of Riddell’s claims); see also Jonah Lehrer, The Fragile Teenage Brain: An In-
Depth Look at Concussions in High School Football, GRANTLAND (Jan. 10, 2012), http://
www.grantland.com/story/_/id/7443714/jonah-lehrer-concussions-adolescents-fu-
ture-football (Jan. 10, 2011) (quoting Jeffrey Kutcher, who “told a committee of
United States senators that all of the current concussion-prevention products be-
ing sold were largely useless”).  In October 2011, two months after Riddell was de-
cided, Kutcher, the chairman of American Academy of Neurology’s sports section,
testified before a congressional committee on helmet safety, stating: “The simple
truth is that no current helmet, mouth guard, headband, or other piece of equip-
ment can significantly prevent concussions from occurring . . . .  It is extremely
unlikely that helmets can prevent concussions the way they can prevent skull frac-
tures.” Id.  Kutcher went on to “criticize numerous claims by helmet manufactur-
ers suggesting otherwise.” Id. (“[N]oting that even Riddell’s specialized anti-
concussion helmet has only been shown to reduce the rate of concussions by 2.6
percent.”) (emphasis added).
60. For a further discussion of Schutt’s specific Lanham Act claims, see infra
notes 70-84 and accompanying text. R
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tion helmets’”; (b) “statements that the ‘technology’ used in Rid-
dell’s Revolution line of helmets has been shown to reduce the
incidence of concussion”; (c) “one statement that the ‘research
shows’ that  wearers of ‘Riddell Revolution Youth helmets’ were 31
percent less likely to suffer a concussion than traditional helmet
wearers”; and (d) “statements that appear only in PowerPoint
presentations to [Riddell’s] sales force.”61  In addition, Riddell is-
sued a press release in March 2009 stating “the Riddell Revolution
helmet is the standard against which all football helmets are mea-
sured . . . .”62  The claims appeared in general advertisements, in a
March 2009 press release, and in one rush mailer.63
The Riddell advertisements relied heavily on a 2002-2004 self-
commissioned scientific study (the “Riddell Study”).64  Starting in
2002, the University of Pittsburg Medical Center, funded by a grant
from Riddell, conducted a study to compare the concussion rates
and recovery times for athletes wearing the Riddell Revolution hel-
met compared to those wearing traditional helmets.65  The study
was criticized by experts because of its inherent subjectivity, includ-
ing the facts that it was commissioned by Riddell, funded by Rid-
dell, executed by at least one author who was employed by Riddell,
and authored by at least two individuals who were business partners
with Riddell.66  Nevertheless, Riddell’s advertisements represented,
61. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 975-76 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (detailing advertise-
ment statements based on Riddell Study).
62. See id. (quoting Riddell press release).
63. See id. (detailing where Riddell’s claims appeared).
64. See id. at 967 (introducing 2002-04 Riddell Study).
65. See id. at 967 (reporting on Riddell Study).
66. See id. at 967, 968 (describing conflicts of interest in Riddell Study); see also
Defendant’s Amended Answer at 1, Riddell, 2010 WL 3051222 (W.D. Wis. June 17,
2009) (No. 3:08-cv-00711-BBC) (stating Schutt’s Declaratory Judgment Counter-
claims).  In its counterclaim, Schutt noted that the Vice President of the National
Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment (NOCSAE), similarly,
and several other prominent experts, were skeptical of Riddell’s claims to have
developed concussion-reducing technology in the Revolution helmet. See id. at
Counterclaim n.19 (“I do not think this article convincingly makes the case that
the Riddell helmet is significantly better than other new helmets on the market.  I
strongly support the author’s suggestion for additional study by them and corrobo-
ration of their findings by others who are not tied to or funded by Riddell.”); see
also Alan Schwarz, Studies For Competing Design Called Into Question, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
27, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/27/sports/football/27riddell.html?
scp=1&sq=studies%20for%20competing%20design%20called%20into%20ques-
tion&st=cse [hereinafter “Schwarz, Designs Questioned”] (“The study has been
strongly criticized by several prominent experts because it was commissioned by
Riddell and because it tested new Revolution helmets against reconditioned tradi-
tional models of indeterminate age.”); Schwarz 1/4/11, supra note 7 (“[T]he au- R
thors of that [Riddell] study on multiple occasions have recommended further
investigations, better controls and with larger numbers.  If one is going to make
10
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directly or indirectly, that the results of the 2002-2004 Riddell Study
demonstrated “a 31percent reduction in concussions in players
wearing Riddell Revolution helmets.”67  Another issue with the Rid-
dell Study was the manufacturer’s extrapolation of the study results
to all helmets in the Revolution “family”; although the study tested
only the Riddell Revolution helmet, Riddell made the reduction
claim in advertisements for all Revolution products, not merely the
statements relative to the paper we wrote, it should be with the limitations that we
emphasized, and not extrapolated to studies that we suggest should be done and
haven’t been done yet.”) (quoting Dr. Joe Maroon, neurosurgeon at University of
Pittsburg Medical Center and co-author of Riddell Study).
67. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d. at 969 (describing Schutt’s counterclaims and
finding Riddell “relied heavily” on study in advertisements).  Indeed, “most of the
advertisements” referenced the Neurosurgery article. Id.  Moreover, “numerous ad-
vertisements” included the “31% reduction in concussions” language. Id.  Some
advertisements gave more context to Riddell’s claims, such as:
‘[R]esearch has shown that players wearing the Riddell Revolution foot-
ball helmet are 31% less likely to suffer a concussion than players wearing
traditional football helmets.’  Some added that the study showed a re-
duced risk of concussion ‘up to 41%’ and others added that the 41% rate
was only for players who had not previously suffered a concussion.  Most
of the advertisements also included a reference to the Neurosurgery article.
Id.  Despite these claims and their support, skepticism about the advertisements
and the concussion-reduction capability that Riddell touted therein remained. See
Schwarz 10/21/10, supra note 13 (“Outside experts have criticized Riddell for R
overselling the protective properties of the Revolution and its successors.”);
Schwarz 1/4/11, supra note 7 (reporting United States Senator Tom Udall made R
formal request for Federal Trade Investigation to commence against Riddell, “for
its prominent claim that its popular Revolution models decrease concussion risk by
31 percent – which has been criticized by experts for years.”).  For a further discus-
sion of the “Riddell Study,” see infra notes 102-118 and accompanying text. R
11
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tested Revolution helmet.68  It was to these facts, primarily, that
Schutt objected.69
The Riddell Study was referenced in several Riddell advertise-
ments.70  In March 2009, Riddell issued a press release that implied
the Revolution Speed helmet was proven to reduce the risk of con-
cussions by nearly a third: “The name Riddell is synonymous with
football protection . . . .  The Riddell Revolution helmet is the stan-
dard against which all football helmets are measured—shown to re-
duce the risk of concussion by nearly a third.  The Revolution
Speed . . . is taking the football world by storm.”71  In addition,
Riddell sent out a rush mailer letter, citing “ground-breaking re-
search,” which demonstrated “athletes who wear Riddell Revolution
68. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (“Riddell used the phrase [research
shows a 31% reduction in concussions in players wearing Riddell Revolution Hel-
mets] in many advertisements for other helmets in the Revolution ‘family,’ includ-
ing the ‘IQ,’ ‘IQ HITS,’ ‘Youth,’ ‘Speed’ and ‘Speed Youth’ helmets.”); id.
(applying “published research” demonstrating concussion-reduction technology to
Riddell Speed football helmet); see also Schwarz 1/4/11, supra note 7 (“Riddell R
uses the 31 percent figure to market its youth-size Revolutions, which were not
studied at all.”).  Schutt claimed there were important design and material differ-
ences that distinguished the other models from the Revolution, including differ-
ences in the design of the jaw strap, face masks, lining, and shell, which were
thought to affect a helmet’s ability to prevent, or reduce, the risk of concussion.
See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (enumerating material and design distinctions
between Revolution and other models in Revolution family, “including different
face guard mechanisms, materials used in the outer shell and liner, locking rear
pads, mandible designs and padding structures”).  Specific differences between
the Revolution and other models in the Revolution family include (1) the “ABS”
material used in the Revolution Youth helmets, as compared to the adult Revolu-
tion helmet, which uses “a more durable polycarbonate material;” (2) the shape of
the padding in the IQ helmet; (3) the Speed helmet’s shell, face guard, mandible
design, and liner; and (4) the quick-release face guard mechanisms in the Speed,
IE, and the IQ HITS. Id.  On the Revolution, “all high-stress” areas on the helmet,
including the jaw flaps, front vent holes, and chinstrap and face guard attachment
locations, were reinforced to mitigate the risk of cracking. See id. (detailing
Revolution modifications).  Riddell focused on these areas because the study indi-
cated that changes to designs in these areas could affect the helmet’s ability to
reduce concussions. Id.
69. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
70. See id.  The University of Pittsburg Medical Center study tested only the
Riddell Revolution helmet, not any other helmet in Revolution family. See Collins,
supra note 12 at 276 (introducing study of Riddell Revolution helmet, as compared R
to traditional football helmets).
71. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (“The Riddell Revolution helmet is the
standard against which all football helmets are measured – shown in published
research to reduce the risk of concussion by nearly a third.  The Revolution Speed
football helmet – Riddell’s latest breakthrough innovation – is a combination of
protection, comfort, and style . . . .”).  Riddell made other statements about its
superiority in PowerPoint presentations it gave to its sales representatives, such as:
“Riddell’s Revolution Concussion Reduction Technology is its ‘flagship technology
and the basis for every premium helmet in the line.’” Id. at 970.
12
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Youth helmets were 31 percent less likely to suffer a concussion than
athletes who wore traditional football helmets.”72
Additionally, Riddell touted its superiority as the “flagship tech-
nology” in helmet protection in internal PowerPoint presenta-
tions.73  Moreover, in July 2008, Riddell presented a PowerPoint to
the NFL, which claimed the Revolution was the “only helmet shown
to reduce risk of concussion on the playing field.”74
Riddell made other statements that named Schutt, specifi-
cally.75  These statements appeared in PowerPoint presentations
given to sales representatives, and were not distributed publicly.76
One such slide compared the Revolution “family” of helmets to
Schutt’s high-end helmets, stating Schutt’s XP “doesn’t stack up.”77
B. The Western District of Wisconsin’s Holding
On July 9, 2010, Riddell moved the Western District of Wiscon-
sin to bifurcate the patent issues from the Lanham Act issues.78
Thereafter, Riddell moved for summary judgment on Schutt’s
counterclaims for false advertising under section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act and deceptive trade practices under the Wisconsin Decep-
72. See id. (attributing results published in Neurosurgery article to Revolution
Youth helmets). But see Schwarz 1/4/11, supra note 7 (“Riddell uses the 31 per- R
cent figure to market its youth-size Revolutions, which were not studied at all.”).
As a result of this and similar claims regarding the Revolution Youth helmet, the
Federal Trade Commission launched an investigation into Riddell and other hel-
met manufacturers’ advertising practices, noting that their advertisements “could
violate the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits misleading descrip-
tions of the protective qualities of a safety device, particularly one used by chil-
dren.” Id.
73. See Riddell, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 969-70 (stating Riddell made representa-
tions to sales representatives in PowerPoint presentations that claimed other hel-
mets in Revolution family, including IQ HITS, Speed, IQ, Speed Youth, IQ Youth,
Revolution Youth, and Revolution Little Pro, offered “Revolution Concussion Re-
duction Technology: shown in peer review study to reduce the chances of a con-
cussion by 31%”).  Riddell cited the 2002 study in support of these claims. See id.
(noting Riddell supported its Revolution family helmets’ “31%-41%” concussion-
reduction rate as “documented through a peer reviewed study”).
74. See id. (describing Revolution helmet as demonstrated to reduce risk of
concussions).
75. See id. at 969-70 (providing “comparative” PowerPoint slides).
76. See id. at 976 (stating PowerPoint statements were “not advertisements at
all, and Schutt has no evidence that sales force ever made similar statements to
members of the public”).
77. Id. at 978 (providing specific example of alleged false statements regard-
ing Schutt helmets).
78. See Motion to Bifurcate Claims, Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d 963 (W.D. Wis.
July 9, 2010), (No. 308CV00711), 2010 WL 3940740  (moving court to bifurcate
patent claims from Lanham Act claims).
13
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tive Trade Practices Act.79  Accordingly, the Court resolved the
issues in separate opinions.  The false advertisement and deceptive
trade practices claims are the subject of this Note.80
In its opinion, the District Court granted Riddell’s motion for
summary judgment.81  First, the court found, with one exception,
that Schutt had failed to identify any literally false statements.82
Second, the court found that Schutt failed to show Riddell’s state-
ments caused harm.83  Accordingly, Schutt’s prayer for declaratory
judgment on its counterclaims was dismissed.84
III. BACKGROUND
Historically, helmet manufacturers have been cautious about
making concussion-related claims of their equipment.85  Riddell
claimed their helmets could prevent the occurrence of concussions
more so than helmets made by other manufacturers.86  In doing so,
Riddell ostensibly claimed that other helmets on the market were
not as safe.87  Predictably, competing manufacturers did not let Rid-
79. Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B); Wis. Stat.
§ 100.18; see also Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 966 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (providing
procedural posture).
80. For a further discussion of Schutt’s counterclaims, see infra notes 42-48 R
and accompanying text.
81. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (stating “none of [Schutt’s] Lanham Act
claims survive summary judgment”).
82. See id. at 974-75 (summarizing “Schutt has not provided any evidence that
supports a conclusion that the results or methods of the concussion study are
unreliable”).
83. See id. at 966 (granting Riddell’s motion for summary judgment on coun-
terclaims for false advertising and deceptive trade practices and denying Schutt’s
prayer for relief).
84. See id. (denying Schutt’s prayer for declaratory judgment on
counterclaims).
85. See Anderson, supra note 15 (“None of the three major football helmet R
manufacturers . . . can make claims about concussion reduction or prevention.”).
Riddell, Schutt, and Adams USA, the three major football helmet manufacturers,
concur that “no helmet is concussion-proof.” Id.  Moreover, prior to 2002, they
tended to “shy away from words such as ‘safer’” because of “liability issues.” Id.
(describing Riddell’s cautious discouragement of University of Pittsburgh full-
back’s use of Revolution helmet, due to fear that helmet “might be disparaged as
ineffective,” if fullback, who had already suffered two concussions, suffered a third
while wearing Revolution).
86. For a further discussion of the procedural posture of the Riddell case, see
supra notes 35-84 and accompanying text. R
87. See Schwarz 10/21/10, supra note 13 (“Everyone’s afraid of being sued, R
because if you say that certain helmets are better, you’re saying that millions of
them out there now aren’t safe.”) (quoting Dr. Robert Cantu).  Dr. Cantu is a
renowned professor and researcher of neurosurgery, who studies sports concus-
sions at the Boston University School of Medicine. See CHRISTOPHER NOWINSKI,
HEAD GAMES: FOOTBALL’S CONCUSSION CRISIS vii (2007) (listing Dr. Cantu’s acco-
14
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dell get away with that indirect allegation.88  But the response came
from more than just Schutt; head injury doctors and scientists, com-
petitors, legislators, and consumers objected to Riddell’s claims.89
A. The Science of Concussions
A concussion is a traumatic brain injury induced by sudden
bodily impact that causes the brain to crash against the skull.90
Concussions are common in contact sports; however, until recently,
little was known about concussions, their long-term effects, or their
prevention.91  Although researchers are studying how to prevent
lades: Chairman, Department of Surgery, Boston University School of Medicine;
Chief, Neurosurgery Services, Director, Service Sports Medicine, Emerson Hospi-
tal, Concord, Massachusetts; Co-Director, Neurological Sports Injury Center, Brig-
ham and Women’s Hospital, Boston, MA; Neurosurgery Consultant, Boston
College Eagles and Boston Cannon’s Lacrosse teams).  Dr. Cantu is also the Vice
President of NOCSAE, the National Operating Committee on Standards for Ath-
letic Equipment, which promulgates standards for helmet safety. See id. (introduc-
ing Dr. Cantu and NOCSAE).  Although NOCSAE has successfully prevented skull
fractures and brain bleeding caused by extreme forces, NOCSAE helmet standards
do not address concussions. See id. (explaining that preventing concussions is dif-
ferent, and “trickier,” than protecting against skull fractures).  Nevertheless, Dr.
Cantu has “been calling for a new standard to be written for football helmets for
years,” but to no avail. Id.  According to Dr. Cantu, NOCSAE has not attempted to
supplement its helmet standard to account for concussive impacts, because if it
did, it would become vulnerable to lawsuits. See id.  (expounding upon rationale
for not attempting to address concussions in helmet standards: “it could open itself
to lawsuits brought by players saying that their helmet did not prevent the injury”).
88. Awareness and concern regarding head injuries in football and other con-
tact sports have risen drastically in the last few years. See, e.g., Emily Aronson, Con-
cussion Research Aims to Help Athletes, Study of the Brain, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY NEWS
(Oct. 17, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S31/
80/06C59/index.xml?section=topstories#top (noting growing practice of precau-
tions and testing in sports medicine); ASSOCIATED PRESS, States Consider Youth Con-
cussion Laws, ESPN.COM (Jan. 28, 2010, 10:14 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/
espn/news/story?id=4865622 (exonerating nation-wide support of state-regulated
youth concussion policies); Concussions In the NFL, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.
com/nfl/topics/_/page/concussions (last updated Sept. 7, 2011) (describing NFL
efforts to regulate concussions).  For a further discussion of the rising awareness
and concern regarding head injury in contact sports, see infra notes 90-101 and R
accompanying text.
89. For a further discussion of the atmosphere that generated the response to
Riddell’s claim, see infra notes 90-191 and accompanying text. R
90. See What is a Concussion, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nfl/topics/_/page/
concussions (last updated Sept. 7, 2011) (defining concussion); NCAA, 2011-12
NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook 54, available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/
DownloadPublication.aspx?download=MD11.pdf [hereinafter Handbook] (provid-
ing technical definition of concussion: “a complex pathophysiological process af-
fecting the brain, induced by traumatic biomechanical forces”).
91. See Handbook, supra note 90 at 53 (reporting higher incidence of concus- R
sions in “helmeted sports”); see also Schwarz 10/21/10, supra note 13 (noting un- R
certainty of how concussions occur).
15
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concussions in contact sports, there is no workable solution right
now.92
Researchers have, however, discovered significant correlation
between multiple concussions and decreased cognitive function-
ing.93  The two major contemporary studies of the long-term effects
of concussions are being conducted by Boston University’s Center
for the Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy and the Brain Injury
Research Institute.94  Dr. Robert Cantu, Vice President of the Na-
tional Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment
(NOCSAE), directs the Boston University study, and is assisted by
Dr. Ann McKee and the Sports Legacy Institute, which is run by
Chris Nowinski.95  Dr. Bennet Omalu conducts the research at the
Brain Injury Research Institute.96
Dr. Omalu and the Boston University researchers have ex-
amined the brains of deceased athletes for signs of chronic trau-
matic encephalopathy (CTE), which they believe results from
repeated concussive blows to the head.97  To date, the researchers
92. See Schwarz 10/21/10, supra note 13 (asserting biochemists are “unsure of R
how to prevent concussions” in football).
93. See, e.g., David Cifu, Repetitive Head Injury Syndrome, MEDSCAPE REFERENCE
(Nov. 16, 2010), http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/92189-overview#a0107
(“Numerous studies . . . have shown that repeated brain injury can lead to chronic
encephalopathy, termed dementia pugilistica.”); Gladwell, supra note 2 (discussing R
long term effects of multiple concussions); see also ASSOCIATED PRESS, Athletes Donat-
ing Brains for Injury Study, ESPN.COM (Oct. 12, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/
espn/news/story?id=5677532 (stating athletes with increased amounts of head
trauma are more likely to produce CTE); Les Carpenter, ‘Brain Chaser’ Tackles Ef-
fects of NFL Hits, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2007), available at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/24/AR2007042402480_pf.html (re-
porting significant trending of CTE in athletes, following Dr. Bennet Omalu’s dis-
covery of CTE in three former NFL players).
94. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Athletes Donating Brains for Injury Study, ESPN.COM
(Oct. 12, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=5677532 [herein-
after “Brain Injury Study”] (describing BU Medical School and Sports Legacy Insti-
tute collaborative brain research program).
95. See Brain Injury Study, supra note 94 (describing collaborative brain re- R
search efforts at Boston University); see also Gladwell, supra note 2 (introducing R
activist Chris Nowinski, former college football player and professional wrestler
who suffered six concussions during his athletic career); NOWINSKI, supra note 87, R
at 2-4 (describing Nowinski’s experience in college football and World Wrestling
Entertainment and his six concussions, prompting his interest in publicizing risks
of concussions).  For a further discussion of Dr. Robert Cantu’s background and
accolades, see supra note 87 and accompanying text. R
96. See Gladwell, supra note 2 (crediting Dr. Omalu with first discovery of R
chronic traumatic encephalopathy, or “CTE,” in brain of former NFL player in
2002).
97. See id. (explaining CTE); see also Carpenter, supra note 93 (“The proteins R
appear when the brain is hit, but disappear as the healthy brain cells devour them,
leading to recovery.  Yet when the brain suffers too many blows, the brain cells
can’t keep up with the protein and eventually give up and die, leaving just the red
16
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have found “the telltale red flecks of abnormal protein,” indicating
CTE, on all but one of the former athletes’ brains.98  The findings
indicate that “repeated concussions can, some twenty years after the
fact, have devastating consequences if left unrecognized and un-
treated,” including an increased risk of depression, dementia, and
suicide.99  The recent death and bequest of former NFL player
Dave Duerson’s brain to the study may add even more credence to
the researcher’s theory.100  Thus, the atmosphere leading to, and,
even more so, following Riddell, was one that demanded increased
concussion awareness, honest prevention efforts, and comprehen-
sive management.101
B. The Riddell Study
1. The Method
In 2002, Riddell commissioned a study at the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) to compare the concussion
flecks.”); Alan Schwarz, Pro Football; Expert Ties Ex-Player’s Suicide To Brain Damage
From Football, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2007), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.
html?res=9B06EFD81130F93BA25752C0A9619C8B63&pagewanted=print [herein-
after Schwarz 1/18/07]  (describing Dr. Omalu’s research, deaths of former foot-
ball players, and subsequent brain analyses, which have revealed effects of
“postconcussive brain dysfunction”).
98. See Carpenter, supra note 93 (listing findings of CTE in former football R
players); see also Gladwell, supra note 2 (noting discoveries of CTE in football play- R
ers). But see Gladwell, supra note 2 (noting one former player’s brain did not show R
CTE and hypothesizing because deceased played running back position, and
therefore sustained fewer successive head injuries than line position, and because
he had only played in NFL for two years, CTE might not have been present).
99. See, e.g., Bill Dwyre, Dave Duerson’s Suicide Could Be A Turning Point for NFL,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/25/sports/la-sp-
dwyre-dave-duerson-20110226 (describing Duerson’s suicide shot to the heart with
note requesting brain be delivered to N.F.L. brain bank); Schwarz 1/18/07, supra
note 97 (referring to multiple suicides by former NFL players whose brains con- R
tained signs of CTE).
100. See Dwyre, supra note 99 (“Now, Duerson has raised the stakes.  He has R
apparently martyred himself for a cause.  And if he properly identified his symp-
toms, and the Boston University doctors confirm this in the next several months,
no amount of rationalizing or preservation on head-injury issues – past or present
– will be acceptable.”).  Duerson committed suicide on February 17, 2011, at the
age of 50, following months of headaches, blurred vision, and deteriorating mem-
ory. Id.  In a story of “unimaginable tragedy and incredible significance,” Duerson
shot himself in the heart, not the head, because, as he revealed in his final note, he
wanted his brain to be given to the NFL brain bank for evaluation. See id. (recal-
ling Duerson’s suicide note); Karen Hawkins, Duerson’s Family Sues NFL Over His
Suicide, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 23, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wire
Story/duersons-family-sues-nfl-suicide15776848#.T0baMiNGzwg (announcing
complaint filed against NFL due to Duerson’s suicide).
101. See Dwyre, supra note 100 (“This 2010 [NFL] season was the year of con- R
cussion awareness.”).
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rates and recovery times for football players wearing the Riddell
Revolution helmet, as compared to those wearing traditional hel-
mets.102  The three-year study used ImPACT neurocognitive testing
software to measure the concussion rates and recovery times.103  In
its Research Proposal, the study provided “directional hypotheses,”
which suggested that athletes wearing the Revolution helmet would
sustain fewer concussions, and would recover more quickly than the
control group wearing traditional helmets.104
Study participants were not selected at random; rather, the
study focused on a particular group of approximately 2,000 high
school players in the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Associa-
tion.105  Slightly more than half of the athletes wore the new
Revolution helmets.106  The remainder wore traditional helmets,
drawn from the school’s inventory, which were not necessarily
new.107
After the first year of the study, the authors found that concus-
sion rates among all athletes in the study were identical.108  In 2003,
102. See Riddell, Inc., v. Schutt Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 966 (W.D.
Wis.) (describing how Riddell underwrote concussion study by providing salary
support for study’s two leading authors, and noting that study’s third author was
employed by Riddell). The study took place from 2002 until 2004. See id.; see also
John Helyar, Helmets Preventing Concussion Seen Quashed by NFL-Riddell, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-18/helmets-prevent-
ing-concussion-seen-quashed-by-nfl-riddell.html (stating Riddell invested $336,000
in UPMC project, “aimed at demonstrating that the Revolution reduced
concussions”).
103. See Helyar, supra note 102 (noting that three authors of study were co- R
owners of ImPACT, who also had business arrangement not to compete with
Riddell).
104. See id. (defining “directional hypothesis” as “generated from a theory
that would suggest that a relationship between two variables should go one way or
the other”).  Specifically, the directional hypothesis included in the Research Pro-
posal provided:
(1) Athletes wearing the Revolution will exhibit significantly fewer inci-
dences of cerebral concussion compared to the [traditional helmet]
group; (2) Athletes wearing the Revolution will exhibit fewer and shorter-
duration-on-field markets of concussion severity as compared to control
subjects; and (3) Post-concussion neurocognitive dysfunction and post-
concussive symptoms will resole earlier in athletes wearing the Revolution
helmet relative to athletes not wearing this helmet.
Id.
105. See id. (defining study as “a prospective cohort study”).
106. See id. (explaining that Revolution helmets used in 2002 were new, but
were refurbished and reused in subsequent years of study).
107. See id. (noting National Athletic Equipment Reconditioners Association
refurbished and recertified any non-new helmets each year according to standards
set by National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment).
108. See id. (reporting that concussion rates between athletes wearing Revolu-
tion helmet and athletes wearing traditional helmets during 2002 season were
“nearly identical”).
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the second year of the study, the authors reported that concussion
rates between the two groups of athletes were “not statistically sig-
nificant.”109  In the third and final year of the study, two reports
were made.  The first, an internal report, provided that, of the
2,207 three-year participants, 1,173 were fitted with Revolution hel-
mets, and 1,034 with traditional helmets.110  Further, it provided
that 5.29 percent of the athletes wearing the Revolution sustained
cerebral concussions, as compared to 7.16 percent of those athletes
wearing the traditional helmets.111  However, the authors found
that “the difference between the groups approached, but did not
reach statistical significance.”112
The second, and final, report of the three-year study reported
results from 2,141 study participants.113  By these numbers, the au-
thors reported the concussion rates were 5.3 percent for athletes
wearing Revolution helmets, and 7.6 percent for athletes wearing
traditional helmets, which the authors deemed a “statistically signif-
icant difference.”114  Accordingly, the authors concluded, “there
was a 2.3 percent decreased absolute risk for sustaining a concus-
sion and a 31 percent decreased relative risk for athletes wearing
the Revolution helmet.”115
2. Publication
Riddell submitted the results of the three-year study to Neuro-
surgery for publication.116  The article went through a peer review
process, where it received many critiques from reviewing neurology
109. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 967-68 (adding that although concussion
rates between study groups were not statistically significant, “the difference ‘ap-
proached’ statistical significance”).
110. See id. at 968.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See Helyar, supra note 102 (describing final report of three-year study). R
The final report disregarded data from sixty-six participants, all of whom wore
traditional helmets. See id.  Thus, the final report considered 2,141 athletes, 1,173
of whom were fitted with Revolution helmets, and 968 of whom were fitted with
traditional helmets. See id.
114. See id.  Moreover, two authors noted that the results “ ‘demonstrated a
trend toward a lowered incidence of concussion,’ but the ‘limited size sample pre-
cludes a more conclusive statement of findings at this time.’” Id.
115. See id. (comparing concussion rates between two study groups and con-
cluding Revolution helmet decreased risk of concussion by 31%). But see Schwarz
10/21/11, supra note 13 (quoting Dave Halstead, technical director of NOCSAE, R
who criticized decreased relative risk: “It’s a good helmet.  But I don’t believe that
31 percent for a Yankee minute.”).  For a further discussion of criticisms made by
the study’s peer reviewers, see infra notes 119-126 and accompanying text. R
116. See Schwarz 10/21/11, supra note 13 (categorizing publication as peer- R
reviewed journal in field of neurology).
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experts regarding the methods, reliability, statistical significance,
and neutrality of the study.117  Although the study was eventually
published in 2006, several of the critical comments accompanied
the printed article.118
When a study is not unanimously accepted, dissenting com-
mentary may accompany the published article.119  Reviewers who
were critical of the means of helmet selection were especially dis-
missive of the study’s results.120  One reviewer discounted compari-
son altogether: “It is well recognized that a new football helmet has
a lower severity index rating than an older helmet . . . .  We know
117. See id.; see also Collins, supra note 12 at 275-86 (publishing study). R
118. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (“The published article included com-
ments appended to the study.”).  In his “dissent” over publication of the article, Dr.
Robert Cantu, a leading Neurologist and Vice President of the National Operating
Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment (NOCSAE), the organization
that creates the certification standard for football helmets and other athletic
equipment, explained the rationale for his concern:
I have great respect for the Riddell Helmet and think it is as good as any
helmet being made today.  This article, however, does not convince me
that it is superior.
First . . . [Neurosurgery peer] reviewers do not verify the authenticity of
data and, occasionally, papers may be published over certain reviewers’
objections . FalseThis article, in my opinion, suffers from a serious, if not
fatal, methodological flaw that precludes my not doubting the data, but
doubting the significance of the data.  The flaw is that we do not know
the age of the helmets that comprised the non-Riddell group.  We assume
the Riddell helmets were either new or nearly new because the product is
new.  However, the helmets that the Riddell helmets were being com-
pared against are of indeterminate age and were very likely significantly
older . . . .  It would be expected that if the newer Riddell helmets, there-
fore, are being compared against helmets that are significantly older, that
the older helmet would not perform to as high a degree as the newer
helmet.  That is why today when parents or athletes ask me which is the
best helmet to wear, I tell them I don’t know which brand is best, but I
know that a new helmet will be better than an old helmet and if recurring
concussions are a concern that they should equip themselves with a new
helmet.
Collins, supra note 12, at 284.  For a further discussion of those comments that R
appeared in the published material, see infra notes 119-126 and accompanying R
text.
119. See Collins, supra note 12, at 284 (explaining that articles “may be pub- R
lished over certain reviewers’ objections,” in which case reviewers may “offer con-
structive suggestions in terms of how to make the article better”).
120. See Collins, supra note 12, at 284 (noting “the study has several limitations R
in its design which may influence the results”).  Another reviewer expressed con-
cern over the selection of helmets, indicating the haphazard selection might have
affected the study, so that it would be impossible, conclusively, to attribute the
differences in results to one particular cause: “helmet selection was neither ran-
domized or [sic] controlled, and that younger patients tended to use the older
helmet type, and that group may be more susceptible to concussions.” Id.  An-
other, echoing similar concern over the study’s “several limitations,” agreed that
one such limitation was the fact that “helmet selection was neither randomized,
nor controlled.” Id.
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the Riddell helmets in this study are new but we have no mention of
the age of the other helmets.  This invalidates any comparison.”121
Another reviewer announced that the study “‘suffers from a serious,
if not fatal methodological flaw,’ raising doubt about the ‘signifi-
cance of the data’ because the age of the helmets was not
known.”122
Some reviewers were skeptical of the statistical import of the
data.123  One suggested that “the three years that were used in the
study was needed to enroll enough subjects so that the results
would attain statistical significance.”124  Another was “not convinced
that significant differences in technology exists between the Revolu-
tion and traditional helmet models.”125  Finally, reviewers noted a
“substantial conflict of interest” in the study, due to the fact that
“each of the authors has a business relationship with either Im-
PACT or Riddell.”126
121. Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (quoting reviewer who declared mode of
testing helmets “invalidate[d] any comparison”).
122. See id. at 969 (commenting upon study’s flaws).  This comment appeared
in the published version of the study. Id.  Other criticisms of the study were pub-
lished in Neurosurgery, including:
(1) the alleged existence of conflicts of interest resulting from the coun-
terclaim defendant’s funding of the study and its relationship with the
owners of the diagnostic software used in the study; (2) the non-random
sampling method used by the study’s authors; (3) the study’s failure to
disclose information on the age and condition of the traditional helmets
used as controls; (4) discrepancies between the number of participants in
earlier reports and in the study’s final report; (5) what the authors con-
sidered to be the “preliminary” nature of the study; and (6) the study’s
failure to address data collected in the years after the data discussed by
the study.
Theodore Davis et al., The Sixty-Fourth Year of Administration of the U.S. Trademark
(Lanham) Act of 1946, 102 THE TRADEMARK REP. 1, 219-20 (2012).
123. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (criticizing statistical significance of
data).
124. Id. (citing criticism from skeptics).
125. Id.  (discussing further criticism of data).
126. See id. at 968, 969; Collins, supra note 12, at 285 (“Most importantly, each R
of the authors has a business relationship with either the computerized
neurocognitive testing equipment company (ImPACT) or the helmet manufac-
turer (Riddell) that were being evaluated. This fact represents a substantial conflict of
interest, and the results should be interpreted accordingly.”) (emphasis added).
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C. False Advertising Under Lanham Act Section 43(a)
Claims of “false advertising” are brought under the Lanham
Act, section 43(a).127  To prevail on a false advertising claim, a
plaintiff must prove five elements.128  Section 43(a) provides:
(1) the defendant made a false statement of fact about its
product or another’s product in a commercial advertise-
ment, (2) the statement has a tendency to deceive or actu-
ally deceived a substantial segment of its audience, (3) the
deception is material, that is, it is likely to influence
purchasing decisions, (4) the defendant caused its false
statement to enter interstate commerce, and (5) the plain-
tiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result, either by
direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by a
loss of good will that is associated with its products.129
Under the first element, the false statement may be either: (1) liter-
ally false, as a factual matter; or (2) “literally true or ambiguous,”
but “implicitly conveys a false impression,” or is misleading and
likely to deceive consumers.130  If the statement is literally false, the
complaining party need not show evidence of consumer confusion
or deception.131  Rather, the plaintiff need only demonstrate falsity
and injury.132
1. Establishment Claims
Under the Lanham Act section 43(a), a claim of literal falsity
may challenge either an “establishment” or a “non-establishment”
advertisement.133  An establishment advertisement takes the form:
127. Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (asserting how
false advertising claims are brought).
128. See Hot Wax, Inc., v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B)) (providing
five elements for proving false advertising under statute).
129. Hot Wax, 191 F.3d at 819 (discussing false advertising claim)
130. Id. at 820; see also Thermal Design, Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Heating, 775 F.
Supp. 2d 1082 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (laying out first element of statute requirements).
131. See Hot Wax, 191 F.3d at 820 (“When the statement in question is actually
false, the plaintiff need not show that the statement either actually deceived cus-
tomers or was likely to do so.  In contrast, when the statement is literally true or
ambiguous, the plaintiff must prove that the statement is misleading in contact by
demonstrated actual consumer confusion.”).
132. See id. (discussing requirements of first element).
133. See Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 952 (3rd Cir. 1993) (intro-
ducing two categories of literal falsity claims under Lanham Act).  In Riddell, the
challenged advertisements were establishment claims of literal falsity. See Riddell,
Inc. v. Schutt Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 971 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (noting
challenged advertisements all refer to establishment claims).
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“tests prove the asserted proposition.”134  In other words, establish-
ment claims represent to consumers that they are based upon tests
that purport to establish the advertised claim.135  A non-establish-
ment claim, on the other hand, does not purport to be based on
test results.136  Where the defendant’s advertisement claims prod-
uct superiority, a “plaintiff must affirmatively prove defendant’s
product equal or inferior” to prove the claim is literally false.137  A
plaintiff may do this “ ‘only upon adducing’ evidence that affirma-
tively shows defendant’s claim to be false.”138
A plaintiff may prove the literal falsity of an establishment
claim by demonstrating one of two alternatives: (1) the tests are
“not sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable
certainty that they established the claim made;” or (2) the study
does not prove the proposition that is advertised.139  A plaintiff may
demonstrate that a test is not sufficiently reliable by either: (1) un-
dermining the validity of the study; or (2) showing the results are
undermined by other studies.140
134. Castrol, 987 F.2d at 952 (defining establishment advertising claim); see
also Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (explaining that establishment claims are
“presented in the form ‘tests show x’ (or ‘establish x’)”) (quoting BASF Corp. v.
Old World Trading Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1994)); Castrol, Inc., v.
Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 62 (2nd Cir. 1992) (providing plaintiff must
prove “literally false an advertised claim that tests prove defendant’s product supe-
rior” to prevail on establishment claim of false advertisement).
135. See Castrol, 987 F.2d at 952 (“[E]stablishment claims state to the con-
sumer that they are based upon tests and, therefore, provide the consumer with
the expectation that tests actually support the claim at issue.”).
136. See Quaker State, 977 F.2d 62, 63 (noting requirements for non-establish-
ment claim).
137. See id. (establishing plaintiff’s burden).
138. See id. (quoting Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s Inc., 747
F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1984)) (identifying standard).
139. See id. (endorsing “not sufficiently reliable” test in Third Cir.); see also
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s Inc., 747 F.2d 114, 119 (2nd Cir.
1984) (applying “not sufficiently reliable” test in Second Cir.); Rhone-Poulnec
Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 F.3d 511, 514-15 (8th
Cir. 1996) (using “not sufficiently reliable” test in Eighth Cir.); Mylan Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1993) (adopting “not sufficiently
reliable test” in Fourth Circuit); Bracco Diagnostics, Inc., v. Amersham Health,
Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 468 (D.N.J. 2009) (“Moreover, if the plaintiff can show
that the tests, even if reliable, do not establish the proposition asserted by the
defendant, the plaintiff has met its burden of demonstrating literal falsity.”); Rid-
dell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (“Establishment claims can be shown to be false by
showing that the cited test or study ‘does not prove the proposition.’”) (quoting
BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1994)).
140. See Bracco, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 384 (describing means for plaintiff to prove
studies are not sufficiently reliable).
23
Reilly: Where is Concussion Litigation Headed?  The Impact of Riddell, In
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS207.txt unknown Seq: 24 14-JUN-13 14:39
540 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 517
For example, in Zeneca, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,141 the plaintiff,
the manufacturer of the drug Nolvadex (approved by the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) to reduce the risk of breast can-
cer), brought a false advertising claim against a competing manu-
facturer who claimed its drug, Evista, was also shown to reduce the
risk of breast cancer.142  The defendant based its claim on the re-
sults of a clinical trial, published in a peer-reviewed journal, that
proved the drug’s effectiveness in reducing osteoporosis, and noted
that further research was needed to determine its effect on breast
cancer.143  The District Court held that the study was unreliable as
to defendant’s claims that the drug reduced the risk of breast can-
cer.144  Further, the court noted that because the results of the
study were not disseminated in their entirety, the reviewers were
unable to identify certain “critical flaws” in the study.145  Finally, the
Zeneca court found it persuasive that the FDA, “the agency responsi-
ble for determining the safety and efficacy of prescription drugs in
141. 1999 WL 509471 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999).
142. See id. at *1 (providing facts).
143. See id. (detailing defendant’s establishment claim).  Moreover, the FDA
had required the defendant to include in the label that Evista’s effectiveness “in
reducing the risk of breast cancer has not yet been established.” Id.
144. See id. (finding study was not sufficiently reliable due to “nearly unani-
mous” consensus by FDA and “numerous experts” in relevant field that cited study
did not prove drug reduced incidence of breast cancer due to study’s flaws, e.g.
study participants were not randomized on basis of risk factors; and study was not
intended to consider effect of drug on breast cancer); see also id. at *30 (explaining
“mere fact of publication in a peer-reviewed article does not prove that the claim
in question is true”).  The defendant argued that publication established “scien-
tific proof” of the claims; however, the court held that publication “plain[ly] . . .
does not establish reliability.” Id. at *29.
145. See id. at *30 (“The peer reviewers . . . were not given the [study’s] proto-
col and thus were not in a position to assess the flaws in the . . . study design as a
breast cancer trial.”).  The court found that the study was unreliable because it
suffered from several “critical flaws,” including: (1) it was not designed to deter-
mine whether the drug could reduce breast cancer; (2) participants were not ran-
domized; (3) participants were not selected for enrollment according to risk of
developing breast cancer; (4) the short duration of the study did not indicate
whether the preliminary results would continue to be seen; and (5) the study “pro-
tocol did not require annual mammograms or breast physical exams.” See id.  Be-
cause the reviewers were unable to examine these flaws, the published article did
not note these limitations. See id. at *18-19, *29-30, *33 (listing peer reviewers’
findings of “critical flaws”).  The court reasoned, therefore, that proper dissemina-
tion was important to the public interest, especially regarding information about
“highly significant drugs.” See id. at *1 (objecting to stated industry practice that
“peer reviewers as a rule are only given the manuscript of the article and nothing
else”).  Accordingly, the court determined, these flaws might have caused an im-
balance in risk factors, meaning that the incidence of breast cancer might have
been underdiagnosed. See id. at *33 (reasoning study’s failure to account for cer-
tain flaws might have led to “false positive” results).
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this country,” had not approved the drug for breast cancer risk
reduction.146
In Bracco Diagnostics, Inc., v. Amersham Health, Inc.,147 the plain-
tiff, a vendor of x-ray equipment, brought a false advertising estab-
lishment claim against a competitor for advertisements that claimed
clinical studies proved the superiority of its x-ray media products
over the plaintiff’s products.148  The court for the District of New
Jersey found the claims that extrapolated the study results to apply
to related, but untested, competing products were literally false.149
Because the study made limited tests between the competitors’
products, the studies were not unreliable for establishing superior-
ity claims about untested products; however, the court determined
that the parties could properly claim that the study determined
“that Visipaque may be better than a LOCM,” provided the party
gave context to the statement.150  In reaching its decision, the
court, relying on the Zeneca court’s rationale, noted that the FDA’s
rejection of the study’s primary conclusion was persuasive in find-
ing the study unreliable.151
In a third case, McNeil-PPC v. Pfizer,152 the plaintiff, the market
leader in sales of floss and dental cleaning products, sued the
maker of Listerine mouthwash.153  The plaintiff brought Lanham
Act claims of false advertising for defendant’s commercial cam-
paign that announced: “Listerine’s as effective as floss . . . .  Clinical
studies prove it.”154  The results of the studies “indicated” that “Lis-
terine was at least as good as dental floss in controlling interprox-
imal gingivitis,” to which the authors and the American Dental
146. See id. at *34 (clarifying that failure to meet federal standards did not
demonstrate, conclusively, that defendant’s claim was false, but was merely persua-
sive evidence).
147. 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 468 (D.N.J. 2009) (explaining plaintiff’s claims).
148. See id. at 397 (reiterating plaintiff’s claims).
149. See id. at 469 (finding defendant’s statement that “ ‘Visipaque is better
than all LOCM,’ is an extrapolation which strays too far from the results and con-
clusions of the underlying . . . studies”).
150. See id. at 472 (requiring parties identify “which products, by brand name,
were actually tested in the study” when making superiority claims and reasoning
conclusions that do not “clearly and conspicuously” identify which products were
actually tested present misleading messages to public).
151. See id. at 470-71 (justifying deference to FDA’s scientific findings and re-
jecting arguments that would require court to “second-guess the expert judgment
of the FDA”).
152. 351 F. Supp. 2d 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
153. See id. at 231 (introducing parties).
154. See id. (providing facts and Lanham Act claims).
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Association (ADA) added: “when flossing was not done properly,
and in individuals with mild to moderate gingivitis.”155
The McNeil court found that the studies were “not sufficiently
reliable” to prove that Listerine was as effective as floss in fighting
mouth disease because the studies showed only that Listerine was
“as effective as improperly-used floss.”156  Additionally, the court
found the literal claim in the advertisement was “overly broad” be-
cause the study samples were limited to individuals with mild to
moderate gingivitis.157  Therefore, the studies did not prove the
products’ equivalent universal effectiveness; rather, they suggested
equivalent effectiveness “only against plaque and gingivitis in indi-
viduals with mild to moderate gingivitis.”158  The court noted the dan-
ger of the overly-broad claim was that consumers suffering from
severe disease might be misled.159
2. Injury
Under the Lanham Act, if a statement is literally false, a plain-
tiff must also show actual or likely injury occurring as a result of the
statement, “either by direct diversion of sales from itself to defen-
dant or by a loss of good will that is associated with its products.”160
Because the Third Circuit had not decided a Lanham Act false ad-
vertising establishment claim issue, the District Court in Riddell re-
lied on the Seventh Circuit’s decisions.161  In L.S. Heath & Son, Inc.
v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court held
155. See id. at 237-38 (hypothesizing user compliance and “behavioral or tech-
nical causes,” such as improper flossing techniques, contributed to studies’ surpris-
ing results); id. at 251 (noting study only included individuals with “mild to
moderate gingivitis”).
156. See id. at 252 (reasoning studies therefore “proved only that Listerine is
as effective as improperly-used floss”).
157. See id. at 251 (finding “literal claim in Pfizer’s advertisements is overly
broad” and advertisements do not limit claim to cases of mild to moderate
gingivitis).
158. See id. at 251-52 (quoting studies’ findings) (emphasis added).
159. See id. at 251 (“[C]onsumers who suffer from severe gingivitis or peri-
odontitis . . . may be misled by the ads into believing that Listerine is just as effec-
tive as floss in helping them fight plaque and gingivitis, when the studies simply do
not stand for that proposition.”).
160. Hot Wax, Inc., v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B)).
161. See Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 979-80 (W.D.
Wis. 2010) (relying on Seventh Cir. decisions regarding false advertising establish-
ment claim issue).
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that a party claiming false advertising under the Lanham Act must
show “a discernable competitive injury.”162
In Heath, the plaintiff, a manufacturer of chocolate products
(including the Heath bar), hired the defendant to install a new
computer system for its business, and permitted the defendant to
advertise plaintiff’s job in a national advertising campaign.163  After
the defendant ran the campaign, the plaintiff brought suit under
the Lanham Act, claiming the defendant’s advertisement cast the
plaintiff in a false light.164
The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was barred from
bringing suit under the Lanham Act because the parties were not
competitors in the computer industry; therefore, there was no “dis-
cernible competitive injury.”165  The court relied on the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s interpretation of the purpose of the Lanham Act, finding:
“the intent of the Act is to protect ‘against unfair competition.’”166
Therefore, a complaining party must show that the injury resulted
from an industry competitors’ misstatements.167
D. Other Concussion-Related Activism
1. NOCSAE Standards
The operative, and only, standard for football helmet safety
was written by NOCSAE in 1973.168  NOCSAE is a nonprofit volun-
teer organization, comprised of coaches, medical personnel, and
helmet makers, which oversees the certification of all football hel-
mets in the United States.169  NOCSAE certifies helmets according
to an index that tests the amount of force that reaches the skull
after a sixty-inch free fall.170  However, NOCSAE does not oversee
the testing, or enforce compliance with the standard, a practice that
162. See L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 575 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding that “[i]n order to have standing to allege a false advertising
claim, . . . the plaintiff must assert a discernible competitive injury”).
163. See id. at 565 (detailing facts of case).
164. See id. at 575 (stating plaintiff’s claim).
165. See id. (providing reasoning Seventh Circuit’s for holding) (emphasis
added).
166. Id. (“In other words, the Act does not create a general, free-floating ‘tort
of misrepresentation,’ unanchored to unfair competition.”) (citing Halicki v. United
Artists Communications, 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
167. See id. (reiterating that parties must be in competition in order for plain-
tiff’s Lanham Act claim to survive).
168. See History and Purpose, NOCSAE, http://nocsae.org/about-nocsae/his-
tory-and-purpose/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (describing history and purpose of
National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment).
169. See Schwarz 10/27/07, supra note 1 (describing NOCSAE function). R
170. See Schwarz 1/4/11, supra note 7 (revealing NOCSAE testing standard). R
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may cause helmets to “convey a level of concussion-related protec-
tion that the headgear is not shown to provide.”171  Moreover, ad-
herence to the NOCSAE standard is voluntary.172
In fact, the NOCSAE standard does not address concussions at
all.173  As concussions have become more of a focal point in contact
sports, experts have grown critical of the outdated helmet standard,
which was initially designed to prevent single, blunt force blows, of
the type that would cause fatal skull fractures.174  The standard has
successfully reduced these types of single-blow fractures, but be-
cause there is little scientific data that provides how concussions
can be prevented, applying the standard to concussions is more dif-
ficult.175  There is a concern that attempting to compensate for the
multiple concussive-type impacts that a helmet may sustain could
compromise how effective the helmet is at withstanding, and
preventing, single high impact blows.176
2. State Legislation
Washington State pioneered the first law aimed at regulating
when a youth may return to play after suffering a concussion.177
Thirty states have followed suit.178  Nine other states, including Cali-
171. Id. (expressing concern that “limited test standard” may convey false
sense of protection).
172. See id. (stating NOCSAE “does not mandate adherence to its standard,”
but it is used “voluntarily, by every level of football,” and suggesting NOCSAE has
two functions: “to avoid skull fractures, and to avoid liability”).
173. See Schwarz 10/21/10, supra note 13 (describing limitation of standard). R
174. See id. (“Helmet standards have not kept up with modern football.”)
(quoting “industry insiders”).
175. See id. (indicating concussion prevention is more difficult to achieve suc-
cessfully because brain can crash against skull “through a wide range of forces,
some arriving straight to the head and others suddenly rotating it”).
176. See id. (asserting that “because football helmets have already prevented
deaths so effectively for decades, and because football’s faster and more violent
environment leaves biomechanics unsure of how to prevent concussions in the
sport, NOCSAE has not asked helmet makers to even try” to adjust standards to
prevent concussive forces).  What is clear, however, is that requiring helmets to
perform a variety of tests from different angles and with different levels of force
would force manufacturers to focus on preventing different types of impacts. See
id. (“[R]equiring headgear to perform across a spectrum of impacts would un-
doubtedly decrease the total number of injuries . . . .”).
177. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.190 (West 2011) (providing Wash-
ington State concussion and head injury guidelines).
178. See State Legislation, THE CONCUSSION BLOG, http://theconcussionblog.
com/state-legislation/ (listing states with youth concussion laws as of January,
2012, which include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and
Virginia).
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fornia, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming have also proposed concussion bills,
which are now pending before their legislative bodies.179
Many state concussion laws require baseline testing and an ed-
ucation component for coaches, parents, and athletes.180  By man-
dating education, states have attempted to put the onus on trainers,
coaches, parents, and even the students themselves to take responsi-
bility for their own future interests.181  While these laws are largely
reactive and do not attempt to prevent the risk of brain injury from
contact sports, they represent an acknowledgement that a standard
should be created to account for these known risks, and mitigate
against further harm.182
3. Concussion-Related Lawsuits
Research and scientific discovery surrounding concussions and
their effects have led to a recent “flurry” of wrongful death lawsuits
against the NFL and Riddell.183  And there is no sign of stopping.184
Nearly forty class action suits have been filed in federal court
against the NFL since July 2011, involving over 850 former players,
and the number continues to grow weekly.185  Approximately one-
179. Id. (counting pending concussion bills).
180. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-271.5 (West 2010).  In Virginia, it is incum-
bent upon the Board of Education to develop and distribute “guidelines on poli-
cies to inform and educate coaches, student-athletes, and their parents or
guardians of the nature and risk of concussions, criteria for removal from and
return to play, and risks of not reporting the injury and continuing to play.” Id.
§ 221-271.5(A).
181. See id. (placing “greater responsibility” on coaches and trainers in deter-
mining whether and when an athlete returns to play).
182. See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PRESS, States Consider Youth Concussion Laws,
ESPN.COM (Jan. 28, 2010, 10:14 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/
story?id=4865622 [hereinafter State Youth Laws] (recalling death of Washington
State high school student in fall 2009, shortly after Washington legislature passed
§ 600.190).
183. See Ken Belson, NFL Faces Flurry of Concussion-Related Lawsuits, SAN FRAN-
CISCO CHRONICLE (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/
c/a/2011/12/30/SPVJ1MIDT9.DTL&feed=rss.sports (surveying “more than a
dozen” lawsuits alleging NFL and helmet manufacturers “deliberately concealed
information about the neurological effects of repeated hits to the head”); see also
In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, MDL No. 2323, 842 F. Supp. 2d
1378 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (Mem.) (granting transfer and consolidation of pretrial pro-
ceedings; naming several actions against NFL, including: Maxwell v. NFL; Pear v.
NFL; Barnes v. NFL; Easterling v. NFL).
184. See Paul Anderson, NFL Concussion Litigation Tracker, NFL CONCUSSION
LITIGATION, http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=262 (last visited Mar. 16, 2012)
(chronicling lawsuit filings as frequently as every day, and questioning whether “we
are anywhere close to seeing the end”).
185. See id. (blogging daily updates on concussion litigations).
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third of the cases named Riddell as a defendant in addition to the
NFL.186
The suits generally allege that the NFL and Riddell have delib-
erately concealed information and distorted data regarding the
neurological dangers of multiple hits to the head.187  The suits ask
for different remedies.  One suit, for example, asks that the NFL
and Riddell set up a medical monitoring program that would test
players to determine whether concussions sustained in the NFL
lead to problems later in life.188  In at least one other suit, the plain-
tiffs seek acknowledgment that the Riddell Study was a farce.189
Specifically, the Jacobs v. NFL complaint alleges: “Riddell has long
been aware of medical issues concerning concussions,” yet it spon-
sored a “worthless” study to support its claims that the Revolution
helmet reduced the incidence of concussions.190  When the mul-
tidistrict suits are consolidated, the federal district court that hears
the case will have to consider the Western District of Wisconsin’s
decision in Riddell v. Schutt.191
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
This part features two sections, the first of which describes the
District Court’s analysis of Schutt’s false advertising counterclaim,
186. See id. (calculating involvement of Riddell in concussion-related
lawsuits).
187. See Ken Belson, For N.F.L., Concussion Suits May Be Test for Sport Itself, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/sports/football/nfl-
faces-retired-players-in-a-high-stakes-legal-battle.html?pagewanted=all (describing
“multifront legal challenge to . . . game itself”); see also Thom Loverro, Maxwell v.
NFL Case Could Hit League Hard, WASHINGTONEXAMINER.COM (July 27, 2011, 7:05
PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/2011/07/thom-loverro-maxwell-v-nfl-case-
could-hit-league-hard/40539 (claiming that NFL and Riddell have known for de-
cades “that multiple blows to the head can lead to long-term brain injury, includ-
ing memory loss, dementia and depression,” but deliberately concealed these
dangers).
188. See Tony Dorsett on NFL: “They Use You Up,” ESPN (Feb. 2, 2012), http://
espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/7532284/plaintiffs-depict-nfl-apathetic-concussions
(asking for relief in form of medical monitoring program for former players who
have suffered concussions).
189. See Jacobs v. NFL, 2011 WL 6371825 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011) (Trial
Pleading) (naming Riddell as defendant in class action complaint and alleging
Riddell knew Neurosurgery study did not prove anything).
190. See id. at *25 (noting that Dr. Robert Cantu has “publicly criticized the
study as being worthless”).
191. 724 F. Supp. 2d 963 (W.D. Wis. 2010).  For a further analysis of the West-
ern District of Wisconsin’s decision, see infra notes 196-293 and accompanying R
text.
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brought under the Lanham Act Section 43(a).192  The false adver-
tising analysis is divided into two sub-sections, which examine, ini-
tially, the court’s approach to the literal falsity prong under the two
available tests.193  Subsequently, the false advertising section de-
scribes the District Court’s analysis of Schutt’s alleged injury.194
The second section examines Schutt’s counterclaim of deceptive
trade practices under the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.195
A. Schutt’s Counterclaims for False Advertising
Under the first prong of the Lanham Act section 43(a), the
suing party must show that the defendant made “a false statement
of fact . . . in a commercial advertisement about its own or another’s
product.”196  The nature of the “false statement” may be: (1) liter-
ally false; or (2) literally true, but implicitly conveys a false impres-
sion, or is likely to deceive customers.197  Where the objectionable
statement purports to prove, or “establish,” a particular proposition
by relying upon the results of a scientific study, the cause of action
192. See id. at 971-80 (analyzing false advertising under § 43(a)(1)(B)).  For a
further discussion of the court’s treatment of these claims, see infra notes 196-293 R
and accompanying text.
193. See id. at 971 (presenting alternative iterations of literally false establish-
ment claims as stated by Seventh Circuit and Second Circuit).  For a further discus-
sion of the court’s application of the Second Circuit test, see infra notes 210-236 R
and accompanying text.
194. See id. at 979-80 (addressing Schutt’s alleged injury).  For a further dis-
cussion of the court’s brief treatment of Schutt’s injury counterclaims, see infra
notes 237-293 and accompanying text. R
195. See Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B); Wis. Stat.
§ 100.18. See also Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 966
(W.D. Wis. 2010) (detailing Schutt’s counterclaims).
196. Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (stating ele-
ments for false advertising).  To prevail on a claim for false advertisement under
the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must show:
(1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertise-
ment about its own or another’s product; (2) the statement actually
deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audi-
ence; (3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the
purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused its false statement to enter
interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be in-
jured as a result of the false statement, either by direct diversion of sales
from itself to a defendant or by a loss of goodwill associated with its
products.
Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (quoting Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d
813, 819 (7th Cir. 1999)).
197. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (providing plaintiff’s burden under
§ 42(a)(1)(B) and requiring “false statement” be either “literally false as a factual
matter,” or “literally true or ambiguous but implicitly convey[s] a false impression
or is misleading in context or likely to deceive consumers”).
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is called an “establishment claim.”198  Unless the statement in ques-
tion is literally false, the plaintiff must also introduce evidence of
customer confusion to prove the second alternative.199  In the ab-
sence of actual confusion, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
establishment claim is literally false.200
To prove an establishment claim is literally false, a plaintiff has
two alternatives.201  The plaintiff must show either: (1) the study
was not sufficiently reliable; or (2) even if a cited study was reliable,
it did not, in fact, “establish the proposition asserted by the defen-
dant,” and was therefore “simply irrelevant.”202  The majority of cir-
cuit courts have endorsed the “not sufficiently reliable” test, first
employed by the Second Circuit; however, the Seventh Circuit has
not.203  Therefore, the Second Circuit test was not binding upon
the Western District of Wisconsin.204
In Riddell, football helmet manufacturer Schutt brought a sec-
tion 43(a) false advertisement counterclaim against its competitor,
Riddell, for commercial advertisements that stated concussion rates
were thirty-one to forty-one percent lower for wearers of the Riddell
Revolution helmet.205  The advertisements cited the results of a
concussion study in support of the claim.206  Accordingly, the Dis-
trict Court analyzed the objectionable statements as establishment
198. See Hot Wax, 191 F.3d at 820 (“When the statement in question is actually
false, the plaintiff need not show that the statement either actually deceived cus-
tomers or was likely to do so.  In contrast, when the statement is literally true or
ambiguous, the plaintiff must prove that the statement is misleading in context by
demonstrating actual consumer confusion.”).  For a discussion of the ways a party
may prove the falsity of an establishment claim, see infra notes 197-293 and accom- R
panying text.
199. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (noting test).
200. See Hot Wax, 191 F.3d at 820 (stating when objectionable statement is
“actually false,” plaintiff need not introduce extrinsic evidence of actual
confusion).
201. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s Inc., 747 F.2d 114, 119
(2nd Cir. 1984) (establishing Second Circuit test for establishment claims).  But see
Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 971-72 (noting Seventh Circuit had not ruled on several
tests for “establishment claims”).
202. Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1992); see also
Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (listing alternatives for establishing literal falsity of
Riddell’s establishment claims).
203. See Chesebrough-Pond’s, 747 F.2d at 119 (providing Second Circuit test:
whether cited study or test is “sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with
reasonable certainty that [the test] established the proposition for which it was
cited”).
204. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 971-72 (noting Seventh Circuit had not
ruled on several tests for “establishment claims”).
205. See id. (stating issue before W.D. Wis.).
206. See id. (providing facts).
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claims.207  The court determined that Schutt did not introduce evi-
dence of actual consumer confusion, and was therefore required to
prove that the advertisements were literally false in order to pre-
vail.208  Accordingly, the court reviewed the establishment claim for
literal falsity by employing both prongs of the literal falsity analysis,
albeit somewhat reluctantly in regards to the Second Circuit test.209
1. Reliability of the Study
The District Court reluctantly applied the Second Circuit test
to determine whether the establishment claim was founded upon a
“not sufficiently reliable study,” and was therefore literally false.210
The Second Circuit “not sufficiently reliable” test, set forth in Chese-
brough-Pond’s, provides: “an establishment claim can be literally false
even if the cited test or study does prove the proposition, if the test
was ‘not sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with reason-
able certainty that the test established the proposition’ for which it
was cited.”211  The District Court defined “reasonable certainty” as:
“whether the methods and findings of the cited study are accept-
able to the relevant scientific community.”212  Moreover, the Court
noted: “rejection by the authors of a study or a regulatory agency is
evidence that the study is not acceptable to the relevant scientific
community.”213
207. See id. (detailing court’s initial determinations of Schutt’s claim).
208. See id. at 971 (finding Schutt provided no evidence of consumer
confusion).
209. See id. (“[F]or the purpose of this opinion, I will assume that the ‘not
sufficiently reliable’ test applies.”)
210. See id. (noting concerns with logic of Second Circuit test); see also Chese-
brough-Pond’s, 747 F.2d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1984) (establishing standard for establish-
ment claims as “sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable
certainty that [the test] established the proposition for which it was cited”).  For a
further discussion of the Second Circuit test, see supra note 139 and accompanying R
text.
211. Riddell, 724 F. Supp. at 971.
212. Id. at 972; compare with Zeneca, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 1999 WL 509471,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999) (finding claims were literally false because cited study
was not sufficiently reliable due to “nearly unanimous” consensus by FDA and nu-
merous experts in relevant field that cited study did not prove drug reduced inci-
dence of breast cancer, study participants were not randomized on basis of risk
factors, and study was not intended to consider effect of drug on breast cancer, but
rather on osteoporosis); Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 397 (D.N.J. 2009) (holding study results were unreliable when find-
ings were extended to similar media other than specific media tested); McNeil-
PPC v. Pfizer, 351 F. Supp. 2d 266, 236-38, 251-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating conclu-
sions that product “was at least as good as” competitor’s were unreliable because
study authors’ statements indicated study results might have been due to factors
other than product’s superiority).
213. Riddell, 724 F. Supp. at 973.
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Although the majority of circuit courts, and the parties in Rid-
dell, compelled the Western District of Wisconsin to apply the Sec-
ond Circuit test, the Court emphasized that the test was not binding
in the Seventh Circuit.214  Moreover, the District Court remained
wary of the test’s logic, noting an “apparent tension” within the Sec-
ond Circuit test.215  The Court explained that, under the Second
Circuit test, if a court were to determine that a study, cited in an
establishment claim, was “not sufficiently reliable,” the test would
deem the study literally false, notwithstanding that the study did, in
fact, truly demonstrate the stated proposition.216  The Court strug-
gled to reconcile that result with the plain meaning of “literally
false,” and suggested that, if a cited test were unreliable, then claims
as to what that test established would be “merely deceptive or mis-
leading, not literally false.”217  In that case, the Court proposed, a
plaintiff should introduce evidence of actual confusion to satisfy the
“false statement” prong of section 43(a).218
Despite its misgivings, the Court applied the Second Circuit
test, and held that Schutt failed to show the study was literally
false.219  The Court found that Schutt did not meet its burden of
proving the study was unreliable because it did not show that the
methods employed were unacceptable to the relevant scientific
community.220  In its analysis, the Court distinguished Zeneca, in
214. See id. at 971-72 (noting “not sufficiently reliable” test is not binding as
“the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has not had the opportunity to apply
[it]”).
215. See id. at 971 (questioning whether “‘not sufficiently reliable’ test should
be applied in this case”).
216. See id. at 971-72 (finding test “leads to a strained reading of the phrase
‘literally false’”).
217. See id. at 972 (addressing tension between plain meaning of “literally
false” and “a conclusion that a statement in the form ‘text shows x’ is literally false
even if the test really does show x”).
218. See id. (suggesting that if test does show x, stating so is not “literally false”
and statement is merely deceptive or misleading if underlying study is unreliable,
not literally false, in which case plaintiff would require evidence of actual con-
sumer confusion to satisfy first prong of § 43(a)); see also id. at 971 (explaining
“false statement” under § 43(a) must be either: (1) “literally false as a factual mat-
ter,” or (2) “literally true or ambiguous but implicitly convey[s] a false impression
or is misleading in context or likely to deceive consumers”); see also Hot Wax, 191
F.3d at 820 (“When the statement is literally true or ambiguous, the plaintiff must
prove that the statement is misleading in context by demonstrating actual con-
sumer confusion.”).  For a further discussion of a complaining party’s burden of
proof where a false statement is literally true, but misleading in context, see supra
notes 130-131, 197, and accompanying text. R
219. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 972 (applying Second Circuit test “for the
purpose of this opinion” only).
220. See id. at 974 (determining Schutt failed to demonstrate study methods
were unreliable).
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which a plaintiff made an establishment claim that a study, pub-
lished in a peer-reviewed journal, proved plaintiff’s drug reduced
the risk of breast cancer.221  In Zeneca, the District Court held, not-
withstanding publication in a peer-reviewed journal, the study was
unreliable; therefore, the establishment claims were literally
false.222  In that case, the plaintiff showed that the peer reviewers
did not assess the full data set and analyses of the study; thus, they
were unable to identify certain flaws within the study design itself
and were therefore unable to properly assess its reliability.223
In this case, the Court found that Schutt merely “recite[d] ob-
jections made by reviewers.”224  This was problematic for two rea-
sons.225  First, the reviewers’ objections did not pertain to the
particular methods used in the study.226  The objections concerned:
(1) conflicts of interests between the testers and the funders of the
study; (2) not randomized or controlled study design; (3) unclear
age of traditional helmets; and (4) speculation about the statistical
significance and the reason for the three-year trial period.227  The
Court reasoned that these concerns casted doubt on the study’s re-
sults, but they did not amount to an outright rejection of the study’s
methods.228
Second, the Court conceded that publication, alone, does not
prove the reliability of a study; however, “the fact that a peer-re-
viewed article was approved for publication is some evidence that
the study is reliable,” and that the objections were not so serious as
221. See Zeneca, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1999 WL 509471, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July
19, 1999) (providing facts).
222. See id. (finding study was not sufficiently reliable due to “nearly unani-
mous” consensus by FDA and “numerous other experts” in relevant field that cited
study did not prove drug reduced incidence of breast cancer due to study’s flaws,
e.g. study participants were not randomized on basis of risk factors; and study was
not intended to consider effect of drug on breast cancer); see also id. at *30 (recog-
nizing “mere fact of publication of a peer-reviewed article does not prove that the
claim in question is true”).
223. See id. (“The peer reviewers . . . were not given the [study’s] protocol and
thus were not in a position to assess the flaws in the . . . study design as a breast
cancer trial.”).
224. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (theorizing Schutt produced enough
evidence to doubt study results, but not enough to show study was not acceptable
to relevant scientific community).
225. See id. (stating reviewers’ objections did not pertain to specific methods
used in study in question).
226. See id. at 972 (noting reliability of study is determined by acceptance of
study’s methods with “reasonable certainty”).
227. See id. at 974 (illustrating reviewers’ concerns with study design).
228. See id. (stating Schutt failed to show study results were unreliable).
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to make the study unreliable.229  Therefore, Schutt had to over-
come the presumption of reliability by the mere publication of a
study in a peer-reviewed journal.230  However, by relying solely on
the dissenting reviewers’ commentary, with no further support to
the contrary, Schutt was unable to overturn the presumption.231
Therefore, because Schutt did not provide any evidence to support
“a conclusion that the results or methods of [Riddell’s] concussion
study are unreliable, Schutt failed to show literal falsity under the
“not sufficiently reliable” alternative.232
Finally, the Court noted that rejection by the authors of the
study, or a responsible regulatory agency, would be persuasive evi-
dence that the study was not acceptable to the relevant scientific
community.233  The Court noted that in Bracco, the FDA, which was
responsible for monitoring the x-ray media field, “rejected the
study’s primary endpoint as not meaningful or reliable.”234  Moreo-
ver, in McNeil, the authors of the study stated that the study was
limited to its explicit facts, and could not be extrapolated beyond
them.235  Therefore, if a regulatory agency or the study’s authors
rejected Riddell’s establishment claim, it would create a presump-
tion that the Riddell Study was unreliable.  However, the Court
found that Schutt failed to provide evidence of either type of
rejection.236
2. What the Advertisements Stated the Study Showed
Alternatively, a plaintiff may prove an establishment claim is
literally false by demonstrating that even if a cited study was relia-
ble, it did not, in fact, “establish the proposition asserted by the
229. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593
(1993)) (emphasis added); see also id. (concluding “fact of publication over peer
reviewers’ objections is evidence that those objections were not serious enough to
make the study unreliable”).
230. See id. (“[T]he fact that a peer-reviewed article was approved for publica-
tion is some evidence that the study is reliable.”).
231. See id. (“[A] party seeking to attack the reliability of a peer-reviewed arti-
cle should do more than recite objections made by reviewers.”).
232. See id. at 975 (discussing implications of lack of evidence by Schutt with
regards to literal falsity analysis).
233. See id. at 973 (“Rejection by the authors of a study or a regulatory agency
is evidence that the study is not acceptable to the relevant scientific community.”).
234. See id. (acknowledging why FDA rejected study in Bracco).
235. See McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 351 F. Supp. 226, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(reporting study showed Listerine was “at least as good as dental floss in control-
ling interproximal gingivitis” when flossing was not done properly) (emphasis added).
236. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 974-75 (summarizing “Schutt has not pro-
vided any evidence that supports a conclusion that the results or methods of the
concussion study are unreliable”).
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defendant,” and is therefore “simply irrelevant.”237  Schutt at-
tempted to prove this by attacking three different types of Riddell
advertisements: (1) advertisements using the study in connection
with Riddell helmets other than the Revolution; (2) advertisements
using the Riddell Study that were directed at age groups other than
high school students; and (3) advertisements that claimed superior-
ity of Riddell’s helmets over Schutt’s helmets.238
a. Statements About the Riddell “Family”
First, Schutt challenged Riddell advertisements that applied
the results of the Riddell Study to helmets other than the Revolu-
tion.239  These advertisements took several forms: (a) statements
that “research shows a 31-41 percent reduction in concussions in
players wearing Riddell Revolution helmets;” (b) statements that
the “technology” in the Revolution family of helmets “has been
shown to reduce the incidence of concussion;” (c) one statement
that “research shows that wearers of Riddell Revolution Youth hel-
mets were 31 percent less likely to suffer a concussion than tradi-
tional helmet wearers;” and (d) “statements that appear only in
PowerPoint presentations to [the internal Riddell] sales force.”240
The court treated most of the statements that referred to other
helmets in the Revolution family quickly.241  With respect to state-
ment (a), the court rejected Schutt’s contention that the statements
were literally false because they appeared in advertisements for
non-Revolution helmets.242  The court determined that the state-
ments embodied the precise findings of the study, and were there-
fore not literally false, regardless of the context in which they
appeared.243
237. See Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1992)
(discussing alternative method to prove establishment claim); see also Riddell, 724 F.
Supp. 2d at 973 (reciting alternatives for establishing literal falsity of Riddell’s es-
tablishment claims).
238. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (listing Schutt’s three allegations of
literal falsity under “study does not establish what the advertisement claims it does”
prong).
239. See id. at 975 (analyzing alleged falsity of Riddell’s advertisements that
used study in connection with helmets other than Revolution helmet).
240. Id.
241. See id. at 975-76 (stating three of Schutt’s challenges to Riddell’s state-
ments “can be addressed quickly”).
242. See id. (treating Schutt’s first argument).
243. See id. (determining “first group is exactly what the study shows,” and
dismissing claim even though statement was “nestled into advertisements for hel-
mets other than the Revolution”).
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The District Court determined that the only literally false state-
ment was (c), which concerned the Riddell Revolution Youth hel-
met.244  The court found this statement was literally false for the
simple reason that the Riddell study did not involve the Youth hel-
mets.245  Statements in category (d), which appeared in the
PowerPoint presentations, were, according to the court, “not adver-
tisements at all.”246  Moreover, the court reasoned that because
there was no evidence that these statements were actually dissemi-
nated to the public, they were not literally false.247
The court devoted more time to statements in category (b),
which concerned the technology in the Revolution family of hel-
mets.248  The issue was whether the technology in the Revolution,
which was shown to reduce concussions, was “equally present in all
the different helmets in the ‘family,’” such that Riddell could claim
that all Revolution-line helmets had been shown to reduce concus-
sions.249  Schutt argued that the concussion-reduction technology
in the Revolution helmet—proven to reduce concussions—was not
the same technology used in all Revolution family helmets.250
Schutt contended that the Revolution’s technology was not ubiqui-
tous among all helmets in the Revolution line because they all had
different design features, “including difference in shell, face guard,
padding, lining, and other features,” that might change their ability
to reduce concussions.251  Because not every Revolution line helmet
had been tested and shown to reduce concussions, it was therefore
false for Riddell to claim that all helmets in the Revolution line
contained concussion reduction technology.252
The court was not persuaded by Schutt’s argument.  It found
that Schutt did not prove these design differences affected the hel-
244. See id. at 976 (“[T]he study did not involve Youth helmets, so the state-
ment that it did is literally false . . . .”).
245. See id. (interpreting Riddell’s “correction” of rush mailer in which third
statement appeared as acknowledgment of literal falsity).
246. See id. (reasoning presentations were not advertisements because “Schutt
has no evidence that sales force ever made similar statements to members of the
public”).
247. See id. (declaring merely presenting statements to sales force internally
did not constitute false advertising).
248. See id. at 975 (analyzing alleged falsity of Riddell’s advertisements that
used study in connection with helmets other than Revolution helmet).
249. See id. at 976 (deliberating over whether Revolution concussion technol-
ogy was ubiquitous throughout entire Revolution family).
250. See id. (presenting Schutt’s argument).
251. See id. (describing Schutt’s contention).
252. See id. (recounting Schutt’s rationale).
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mets’ ability to reduce concussions.253  The court noted that Schutt
carried the burden of showing, conclusively, the literal falsity of the
advertisements, and it failed to do so.254  Therefore, the court held
the advertisements that used the Riddell Study in connection with
helmets other than the Revolution were not literally false.255
b. Statements Targeted at Non-High School Students
Second, Schutt challenged advertisements that targeted age
groups other than high school students.256  Schutt claimed these
statements were literally false because the Riddell Study “was not
designed to be applied to those age groups.”257  Schutt contended
that when an advertised claim is directed at groups outside of a
study’s sample, the claim is overly broad; following McNeil, “an ad-
vertisement claim that is ‘overly broad’ is literally false.”258
The District Court distinguished McNeil, noting the McNeil
court found the “overly broad” claim misleading, as distinct from
“literally false.”259  Accordingly, the District Court found that the
advertisements might have been misleading, but were not literally
false.260  This was true, the court found, even though the study “may
253. See id. (“What Schutt submits instead are general assertions that design
differences to areas like the shell or the face guard can change concussion results.
However, this does not explain why the actual design differences in this case would
be expected to do so.”).  The court’s test was whether design differences between
the Revolution family of helmets were so significant that they constituted an alto-
gether different “technology” than that encompassed in the Revolution helmet; a
technology that the Riddell Study did not test, and therefore did not prove to aid
in reducing the risk of concussion. See id. (detailing court’s rationale).
254. See id. (asserting Schutt had burden to show literal falsity and formulat-
ing test for determining falsity of statements that technology used in Revolution
line of helmets reduced incidence of concussion).
255. See id. (determining Schutt had “established literal falsity of only one
statement related to the use of the concussion study with other helmets . . . .”).
256. See id. at 976-77 (presenting Schutt’s second allegation of literal falsity).
257. See id. at 976-77 (alleging “study does not establish what the advertise-
ment claims it does”).
258. See id. at 977; see also McNeil-PPC v. Pfizer, 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 251
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ruling “the two studies do not stand for the proposition that Lis-
terine is as effective as floss against plaque and gingivitis” because literal claim was
“overly broad”).
259. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 977 (distinguishing on grounds that McNeil
court “did not hold that the claim was literally false because it was overly broad;
instead, the [McNeil] court reasoned that ‘consumers . . . may be misled . . . .’ )
(quoting McNeil, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 251 (reasoning “consumers who suffer from
severe gingivitis or periodontics . . . may be misled by the ads into believing that
Listerine is just as effective as floss in helping them fight plaque and
gingivitis . . . .”)).
260. See id. (“[A]n overly broad claim is misleading, which is different from its
being literally false.”).
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not have been intended to apply outside this [high school student
sample] group” because the study did not include limiting lan-
guage.261  The court reasoned that advertisements with broad state-
ments do not become literally false simply by being directed at
audiences outside of the tested population because such consumers
are not “required” to conclude that their peers were tested; rather,
they are invited, or misled, to such belief.262
c. Superiority Statements
Finally, Schutt challenged advertisements that allegedly used
the study to compare, and claim superiority over, Schutt’s hel-
mets.263  These “comparative” advertisements included both direct
and indirect, or “unqualified,” claims.264  Schutt argued these ad-
vertisements were literally false for two reasons.  First, Schutt con-
tended that the internal PowerPoint presentations to the Riddell
sales force, which made direct comparisons between Schutt and
Riddell helmets, were literally false because the helmets had never
been tested against each other.265  Second, Schutt challenged Rid-
dell’s advertisements that made unqualified comparative claims
without providing the proper point of comparison.266
Schutt’s “direct comparison” argument claimed Riddell’s
PowerPoint “training materials” demonstrated that Riddell was dis-
seminating literally false statements through its sales representa-
tives.267  This argument relied on Zeneca.268  In Zeneca, the plaintiff
sued a competing manufacturer for false advertising for claims that
its drug, Evista, was also shown to reduce the risk of breast can-
cer.269  The Zeneca court found that the studies were unreliable for
establishing that claim, and reasoned that evidence of “scripts” or
“verbatims” that contained these false statements, which the defen-
261. See id. (rationalizing that absence of limiting language does not require
conclusion there were no limitations in Riddell Study).
262. See id. (differentiating between requiring conclusion and suggesting
implication).
263. See id. at 975 (listing Schutt’s third allegation of literal falsity under
“study does not establish what the advertisement claims it does” prong).
264. See id. at 977-78 (describing Schutt’s argument).
265. See id. (noting Schutt’s challenge that any comparison between Riddell
and Schutt helmets was improper because helmets had never been tested against
each other).
266. See id. at 978 (stating Schutt’s contention that Riddell’s claims did not
include traditional helmets as proper comparison).
267. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
268. See Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lily and Co., No. 99-1452, 1999 WL 509471, at *8-9
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999).
269. See id. at *1 (providing facts).
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dant issued to its sales representatives, demonstrated the statements
were, in fact, being disseminated.270
In this case, the court rejected Schutt’s “direct comparison,”
argument by distinguishing Zeneca, noting that “verbatims” and
notes written immediately after representatives’ visits with clients
were good evidence that the exchanges did occur.271  On the other
hand, in this case, there was no evidence that the PowerPoint
presentations were actually given to Riddell representatives, or that
the messages within these presentations were endorsed as verbatim
sales scripts.272  Again, the court’s rationale turned on the distinc-
tion between misleading and literally false statements, stating that
while these “tools” might “suggest that sales representatives were
trained to mislead, they fail to suggest that representatives were
trained to make literally false statements.”273
Schutt’s “unqualified,” or “indirect,” comparative claims argu-
ment asserted Riddell’s claims were “necessarily” false by implica-
tion.274  Specifically, Schutt objected to: (1) “Revolution Helmets
reduce concussions 31 percent;” and (2) “Riddell Revolution hel-
met is the standard against which all football helmets are mea-
sured—shown in published research to reduce the risk of
concussion by nearly a third.”275  As principal competitors in the
football equipment market, Schutt alleged that Riddell’s unquali-
fied superiority claim necessarily, and falsely, implied that the
Revolution was superior to Schutt’s high-end helmets.276  Schutt re-
lied on Castrol, where defendant’s claims that the product “out-
performs any leading motor oil” necessarily implied superiority
over plaintiff’s competing product.277  The Castrol court held “a
270. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 978 (objecting to advertisements that stated
“Reasons Why Riddell Helmets are Superior to Schutt Helmets . . . With RCRT,
Speed reduces the chances of concussion by 31%/41%.  XP doesn’t stack up”); see
also Zeneca, 1999 WL 509471, at *8-9 (reiterating defendant’s objectionable claim
that “Evista has been proven to reduce the risk of breast cancer and that Evista is
comparable or superior to tamoxifen in reducing the risk of breast cancer”).
271. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 978 (distinguishing Zeneca, 1999 WL
509471).
272. See id. at 977-78.
273. Id. at 978.
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 978-979.
277. See id. at 978 (noting Schutt’s argument “that a claim of superiority may
necessarily implicate a principal competitor even when the competitor is not
named” was supported by case law) (citing Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d
939, 948 (3d. Cir. 1993)).
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claim of superiority may necessarily implicate a principal competi-
tor even when the competitor is not named.”278
In this case, the District Court rejected Schutt’s “unqualified,”
or “indirect,” comparison argument.279  The court acknowledged
the validity of the Castrol holding, but found that because Schutt
only objected to the implied superiority as it concerned Schutt’s
high-end products, the Castrol holding was irrelevant.280  The court
formulated the issue as: whether an unqualified statement necessa-
rily implied superiority over “a particular product of the competi-
tor’s.”281  Here, the court found the “reduce concussions” claim did
not necessarily implicate Schutt’s high-end products because there
was “no context” indicating the comparison was specific to the high-
end products.282  Again, the court found that while this might have
been misleading, it was not false.283
Moreover, the court found that there were two ways to inter-
pret “Revolution helmet is the standard against which all football
helmets are measured:” either, the Revolution has been shown to
prevent concussions better than “all helmets;” or, the Revolution is
“the ‘gold standard’ in helmets because it has been shown to pre-
vent concussion” through testing.284  Therefore, because of this am-
biguity, the court found that the advertisements were not
“necessarily false.”285
B. Injury
Under the Lanham Act, if a statement is literally false, a plain-
tiff must also show actual or likely injury occurring as a result of the
statement, “either by direct diversion of sales from itself to defen-
dant or by a loss of good will that is associated with its products.”286
In this case, the District Court determined that only one of Rid-
278. Castrol, 987 F.2d at 947-48.
279. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 978-79 (questioning whether Riddell’s
claims implicated Schutt’s high-end products in addition to standard helmets).
280. See id. (stating further that Schutt suffered no actual injury resulting
from Riddell’s advertisements).
281. Id. at 979.
282. See id. (acknowledging that lack of framing could mislead)
283. See id. (commenting on odd language of advertisement)
284. See id. (laying out two ways Court could have interpreted advertisement).
285. See id. (restating falsity-by-implication test as “whether the ‘consumer will
unavoidably receive a false message’ from the advertisement in its entirety”) (quot-
ing Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer
Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 587 (3d Cir. 2002)).
286. Hot Wax, Inc., v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B)).
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dell’s advertisements was literally false: the rush mailer stating that
Youth helmets were shown to reduce concussions.287  The court
found this statement was literally false for the simple reason that
the Riddell study did not involve Youth helmets.288  However, the
court found no evidence that Schutt had suffered injury from the
rush mailers, as required to recover under the Lanham Act.289  Ac-
cordingly, the court held that none of Schutt’s Lanham Act claims
survived summary judgment.290
Moreover, despite the finding of one literally false advertise-
ment, the court determined that there was no basis for injunctive
relief because Riddell “already removed the reference to Youth hel-
mets from the rush mailer and there is no suggestion they intend to
use that language” in future advertisements.291  The court added
that its decision in Riddell’s favor was “not because Riddell’s adver-
tisements were particularly open and honest, but rather because
Schutt tried to take the easiest evidentiary path to success: literal
falsity.”292  Finally, the court reiterated the distinction it made,
throughout the opinion, between misleading or deceptive adver-
tisements and literal falsity, conceding that Riddell’s advertisements
were, if anything, misleading and deceptive.293
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Riddell case presented a difficult issue for the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin.294First, there was no on-point “literally false” es-
tablishment claim precedent for the court to follow because Riddell
was the inaugural establishment claim case in the Seventh Cir-
287. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 979 (noting that despite one literally false
claim, none of Schutt’s claims pass summary judgment).
288. See id. at 976 (“[T]he study did not involve Youth helmets, so the state-
ment that it did is literally false . . . .”).
289. See id. at 980 (“Schutt has failed to identify any loss of its own or any
profit of plaintiffs that might be related to the single false advertisement
identified.”).
290. See id. (holding, despite finding of one literally false advertisement,
“none of [Schutt’s] Lanham Act claims survive summary judgment”).
291. See id. at 980 (expounding on technical falsity in Riddell’s advertising).
292. See id. (acknowledging Riddell was not blameless).
293. See id. (noting challenged statements were “at most . . . misleading or
deceptive”).  Although the District Court could not provide relief for a merely mis-
leading advertisement, in January 2011 United States Senator Tom Udall of New
Mexico asked the Federal Trade Commission “to investigate whether Riddell’s
claim of a 31 percent reduction in concussions was misleading.” See Helyar, supra
note 102 (noting FTC investigation is ongoing). R
294. See id. at 971-72 (noting Seventh Circuit did not provide guiding prece-
dent for establishment claim issues and stating misgivings with applying existing
tests).
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cuit.295  Second, as the court shrewdly noted, the Second Circuit’s
“not sufficiently reliable” test contains a logical flaw, which may im-
peach its suitability as a test for literal falsity.296
A. Riddell’s “Establishment Claims” Were Literally False
1. The Riddell Study Was Not Sufficiently Reliable
The Western District of Wisconsin found that Schutt failed to
show that the Riddell Study was “not sufficiently reliable” to prove,
with reasonable certainty, that it established the proposition for
which it was cited in Riddell’s advertisements; namely, that the
Revolution has been proven to reduce the risk of concussions by 31
to 41 percent.297  This holding is questionable for two reasons: first,
persuasive case law provides that publication in a peer-reviewed
journal does not create a presumption of validity; second, the court
did not consider the positions of NOCSAE, the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC), or the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC), the entities with responsibility for regulating the consumer
product industry.298
a. Schutt Did More Than Merely “Recite Objections”299
The District Court challenged Schutt to “do more than recite
objections made by reviewers.”300  Ultimately, the court determined
that Schutt failed to meet the Zeneca criteria for rejecting a peer-
reviewed study for three reasons: first, the study’s publication cre-
295. See id. at 971 (explaining Seventh Circuit has not decided establishment
claim involving scientific study or test).
296. See id. at 971-72 (reciting court’s concerns with Second Circuit test).
297. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, 747 F.2d 114, 119 (2d
Cir. 1984) (providing Second Circuit test: whether cited study or test is “sufficiently
reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable certainty that [the test] estab-
lished the proposition for which it was cited”); see also Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt Sports,
Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 974 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (holding Schutt failed to demon-
strate study methods were unreliable).
298. See Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly Co., No. 99-1452, 1999 WL 509471, at *30
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999) (stating “fact of publication of a peer-reviewed article does
not prove that the claim in question is true”); see also Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 470-71 (D.N.J. 2009) (declining to
“second-guess the expert judgment of the FDA”); Zeneca, 1999 WL 509471 at *34
(finding “it is appropriate to consider the views of . . . the agency responsible for
determining the safety and efficacy of prescription drugs in this country”).
299. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d  at 975 (finding Schutt merely “recite[d]
objections made by reviewers,” which was not enough evidence to show study was
not acceptable to relevant scientific community).
300. See id. at 974 (challenging Schutt to demonstrate that “reviewers were
not in a position to identify certain flaws in the protocol used in the study, were
not given the results of trials showing different results and were not given the com-
ments of the FDA . . . .”) (citing Zeneca, 1999 WL 509471, at *29-30).
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ated a presumption of reliability; second, the reviewers’ objections
did not pertain to the particular methods used in the study; and
third, Schutt did not provide persuasive evidence of the authors’
rejection of the study’s claims.301  However, the court’s determina-
tion was improper.
First, the court maintained that publication in a peer-reviewed
journal made the Riddell Study presumptively valid.302  In contrast,
the Zeneca decision developed from the position that “publication
of a peer-reviewed article does not prove that the claim in question
is true.”303  Because the Riddell court presumed the validity of the
study, it gave little weight to the particular objections; instead, it
justified its position by treating the fact that the study was pub-
lished—despite reviewers’ objections—as indicative of how insignifi-
cant these objections were.304
Second, because it presumed the study’s validity, the District
Court did not recognize that the reviewers’ objections pertained to
the particular methods used in the Riddell Study.305  In both stud-
ies, the reviewers cited common concerns, including: (1) partici-
pants were not randomized; (2) participants were not selected for
enrollment based on certain known risk factors; (3) the length of
the study; and (4) the limited data samples.306  In Zeneca, the study
was found unreliable because reviewers were unable “to identify
certain flaws in the protocol” of the study and “were not given the
301. See id. (distinguishing Zeneca, where “the reviewers were not in a position
to identify certain flaws in the protocol used in the study, were not given the results
of trials showing different results and were not given the comments of the FDA
‘concerning the inadequacies of the . . . results’”) (quoting Zeneca, 1999 WL
509471, at *29-30).
302. See id. (concluding “fact of publication over peer reviewers’ objections is
evidence that those objections were not serious enough to make the study unrelia-
ble”) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993)) (em-
phasis added).
303. Zeneca, 1999 WL 509471, at *30 (emphasis added).
304. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (“Nonetheless, the fact that a peer-
reviewed article was approved for publication is some evidence that the study is
reliable.”). But cf. Zeneca, 1999 WL 509471 at *30 (“[T]he mere fact of publication
in a peer-reviewed article does not prove that the claim in question is true.”).
305. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (noting “serious, if not fatal, method-
ological flaw” of Riddell Study, articulated by Vice President of NOCSAE, organiza-
tion responsible for certification standard of football helmets); see also Zeneca, 1999
WL 509471, at *30 (noting that because study results were not disseminated in
their entirety, reviewers could not identify certain of study’s “critical flaws”).
306. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (acknowledging, but not crediting,
peer reviewer criticism).  For a further discussion of the “critical flaws” in the
Zeneca study, see supra note 144 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion R
of the reviewers’ findings of “fatal” flaws in the Riddell Study, see supra notes 118- R
126 and accompanying text. R
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results of trials showing different results.”307  The Riddell court’s de-
termination ignored the parallel between peer reviewers’ “nearly
unanimous” findings of “serious, if not fatal” flaws in the Riddell
Study, and those “critical flaws” that persuaded the Zeneca court to
find the breast cancer study unreliable.308  Under the Zeneca rule,
this evidence was sufficient to find the study unreliable; however,
the Riddell court interpreted the evidence as merely “reciting au-
thors’ objections”.309 Zeneca stated the general “rule” that peer re-
viewers are not provided complete study data and analyses.310  This
general practice was restated in the dissenting commentary pub-
lished with the Riddell Study in Neurosurgery, where one of the au-
thors noted that reviewers were forced to make certain assumptions
about the Riddell Study’s methodology for testing non-Riddell hel-
mets of various age.311  Additionally, as in Zeneca, the Riddell review-
ers were not given the results of trials showing different results for
helmets of varied age.312
Third, the District Court should have considered the limita-
tions that authors and peer reviewers placed on the Riddell
Study.313  Several previous decisions have endorsed this as persua-
sive evidence of unreliability.  In Zeneca, the court found it persua-
sive, notwithstanding its publication, that the study specifically
noted that further research was needed to determine Evista’s effect
307. See id. (challenging Schutt to demonstrate that “reviewers were not in a
position to identify certain flaws in the protocol used in the study, were not given
the results of trials showing different results and were not given the comments of
the FDA . . . .”) (citing Zeneca, 1999 WL 509471, at *29-30).
308. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (noting “serious, if not fatal, method-
ological flaw” of Riddell Study, articulated by Vice President of NOCSAE, organiza-
tion responsible for certification standard of football helmets).
309. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (stating that defendant failed to add
anything to bolster or challenge validity of study).
310. See Zeneca, 1999 WL 509471, at *29 (“[P]eer reviewers as a rule are given
only the manuscript of the article and nothing else.”).
311. See Collins, supra note 12, at 284 (stating “reviewers do not verify the R
authenticity of data” of articles published in Neurosurgery).  The reviewers of the
Riddell Study conjectured about the protocol that was used, and noted it in their
commentary. See id.  One example was helmet age: “we assume the Riddell hel-
mets were either new or nearly new . . . .  However, the helmets that the Riddell
helmets were bring compared against are of indeterminate age . . . .” See id.
312. See id. (speculating about results of testing and implying reviewers were
not shown results of tests done on helmets of varying age: “it would be expected if
the newer Riddell helmets, therefore, are being compared against helmets that are
significantly older, that the older helmet would not perform to as high a degree as
the newer helmet . . . .”).
313. See Collins, supra note 12, at 284 (limiting study’s reliability because, e.g., R
“helmet selection was neither randomized, nor controlled,” haphazard selection of
helmets made it impossible to attribute, conclusively, differences in results to one
particular cause).
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on breast cancer.314  Additionally, in McNeil, the court found that
Listerine could not make claims that extrapolated the particulars of
the study to apply beyond the precise conditions tested; thus, Lister-
ine could not claim to be “at least as good” as floss in protecting
against mouth disease when the study’s authors had limited the
conclusion to apply only when flossing was not done properly.315
The facts were similar in Riddell.316
The authors of the Riddell Study recommended, “on multiple
occasions,” that further investigation was needed to determine the
Revolution’s effect on concussions.317  One author noted: “if one is
going to make statements relative to the paper we wrote, it should
be with the limitations that we emphasized, and not extrapolated to
studies that we suggest should be done and haven’t been done
yet.”318  The suggested areas of study included: controlling for the
age of the helmet; the age of the athlete; level of experience, skill;
amounts of playing time; and any prior incidence of concussion.319
Under Zeneca and McNeil, stated limitations by a study’s authors
confine the scope of permissible establishment claims to the precise
population studied.320
b. NOCSAE, FTC, and CPSC Did Not Endorse Riddell’s
Establishment Claims
Despite the absence of mandatory precedent, the District
Court should have acknowledged the weight that other courts have
given to a regulatory agency’s rejection of a particular establish-
ment claim because of broader public safety concerns.321  In Zeneca,
314. See Zeneca, 1999 WL 509471, at *1 (noting FDA had required defendant
to include in label that drug’s effectiveness “in reducing the risk of breast cancer
has not yet been established”).
315. See McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (reporting study showed Listerine was “at least as good” as floss only when
flossing was not done properly).
316. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (providing authors’ commentary on
study’s flaws).
317. See Schwarz 1/4/11, supra note 7 (quoting University of Pittsburgh Medi- R
cal Center neurosurgeon and Riddell Study co-author Dr. Joe Maroon stating “the
authors of that [Riddell] study on multiple occasions have recommended further
investigations, better controls and with larger numbers”).
318. Id.
319. See Collins, supra note 12, at 282 (listing “significant limitations” to R
study).
320. See Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly Co., 1999 WL 509471, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 19,
1999) (limiting establishment claims to precisely what studies proved); McNeil, 351
F. Supp. at 231 (same).
321. See, e.g., Lehrer, supra note 59 (providing another iteration of broader R
public safety concern with concussions in football: “these cognitive deficits have a
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the court found it persuasive that the FDA, the agency that regu-
lates the safety of prescription drugs, had not approved the defen-
dant’s drug for the reduction of the risk of breast cancer.322
Additionally, in Bracco, deciding that a superiority claim of one
product over all x-ray media equipment, even equipment that was
not tested, was literally false without more context.323  In reaching
its decision, the Bracco court endorsed the rationale in Zeneca, not-
ing that the FDA’s rejection of the study’s conclusion was persuasive
evidence that the overall study was unreliable.324
The Riddell court did not address the issue of federal and pri-
vate regulatory bodies declining to endorse Riddell’s establishment
and superiority claims.325  Three entities, the FTC, the CPSC, and
NOCSAE were publicly critical of Riddell’s “misleading safety
claims and deceptive practices.”326  The FTC and CPSC are legisla-
tive agencies that are responsible for ensuring the honesty of manu-
real-world impact: when compared with similar students without a history of con-
cussions, athletes with two or more brain injuries demonstrate statistically signifi-
cant lower grade-point averages”); Schwarz 10/27/07, supra note 1 (“Concussion is R
the big elephant in the room right now when it comes to helmets . . . .”); Schwarz,
Designs Questioned, supra note 66 (objecting to Riddell’s establishment claims and R
demonstrating public interest concern: “People are running around with that
[Revolution advertisement] selling helmet, and it has not been shown that it
makes a difference.  People get a false sense of security, and you have to hope that
children are not suffering from the promotion of numbers that are not accurate”)
(quoting Dr. Michael Levy, neurosurgeon at Children’s Hospital in San Diego);
Schwarz 1/4/11, supra note 7 (calling for formal FTC investigation into “mislead- R
ing descriptions of the protective qualities” of Revolution helmet, and reasoning
that “[a]thletes, coaches and parents today are increasingly aware of the danger of
concussion, and this awareness influences decisions about buying new and recon-
ditioned football helmets . . . .  Athletes who have already suffered a concussion –
as well as their coaches and parents – may be particularly susceptible to misleading
marketing claims about helmet safety”).
322. See Zeneca, 1999 WL 509471, at *34.
323. See Bracco Diagnostics, Inc., v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d
384, 472 (D.N.J. 2009) (requiring parties to identify “which products, by brand
name, were actually tested in the study” when making superiority claims).
324. See id. at 470-71 (rejecting arguments that would require court to “sec-
ond-guess the expert judgment of the FDA”).
325. See Frommer, supra note 59 (stating that, as to Riddell’s claim that “re- R
search shows a 31 percent reduction in the risk of concussion in players wearing
the Riddell Revolution”: “there is actually very little scientific evidence to support
that claim”) (quoting Senator Tom Udall, member of Senate Commerce Commit-
tee and Consumer Protection Subcommittee, which oversees work of Consumer
Product Safety Commission); Schwarz 10/21/10, supra note 13 (“[The Revolution R
is] a good helmet.  But I don’t believe that 31 percent for a Yankee minute.”)
(quoting technical director of NOCSAE, Dave Halstead); see also Schwarz, Designs
Questioned, supra note 66 (“I think that the Revolution is a good helmet – one of R
the safest, if not the safest, out there.  But I have problems with that particular
study.  The helmet is not shown to do what they say it does.”) (quoting Halstead).
326. See Schwarz 1/4/11, supra note 7 (noting Riddell’s “prominent” estab- R
lishment claim “has been criticized by experts for years”).
48
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/7
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS207.txt unknown Seq: 49 14-JUN-13 14:39
2013] WHERE IS CONCUSSION LITIGATION HEADED 565
facturers and the safety of consumer products.327  NOCSAE is the
entity that sets the standard for football helmet testing.328  The FTC
and CPSC were each, separately, asked to investigate Riddell’s
claims.329  The Court, however, did not consider the objective, con-
sumer-oriented, criticism in its analysis.330
2. The Study Did Not Prove What Riddell Claimed It Established
The court’s treatment of Schutt’s alternative argument for lit-
eral falsity is, generally, legally sound; however, the court’s strict ap-
plication of logical principles ignores the important policy of
consumer protection in a particularly sensitive area of consumer
and legislative concern.331  The court should have considered these
broader concerns in its opinion; although they might not have
changed the outcome, they would have acknowledged a developing
area of law.332  Because of this lack of foresight, the Riddell court’s
dismissal of the counterclaims on summary judgment is not likely to
be followed in the future.333
The court’s treatment of the first group of advertisements,
which claimed the technology in the Revolution “family” was shown
327. See About the Federal Trade Commission, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, http:/
/www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited Mar. 22, 2012) (describing FTC as
agency that prevents “business practices that are . . . deceptive or unfair to consum-
ers”); About CPSC, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, http://www.cpsc.
gov/about/about.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2012) (providing overview of CPSC
function as commission “charged with protecting the public from unreasonable
risks of injury or death from thousands of types of consumer products under the
agency’s jurisdiction”).
328. See NOCSAE, History and Purpose, ABOUT NOCSAE, http://www.nocsae.
org/about/history.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (describing NOCSAE history
and purpose).
329. See Frommer, supra note 59 (announcing congressman’s request for for- R
mal investigation of misleading safety claims by CPSC).
330. For a further discussion of the potential impact of the court’s decision
on future concussion-related lawsuits, see infra notes 362-370 and accompanying R
text.
331. See, e.g., Lebowitz & Mzhen, Players Sue NFL and Helmet Manufacturer Over
Head Injuries, WASHINGTON DC INJURY LAWYER BLOG, http://www.washingtondcin-
jurylawyerblog.com/2011/11/players_sue_nfl_and_helmet_man.html (Nov. 3,
2011) (stating “concussions in sports . . . have received heightened scrutiny re-
cently in both the media and in Congress”).
332. See, e.g., H.R. 1347, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010) (seeking to create and
implement new guidelines for the prevention and treatment of concussions in
school-aged children).
333. See, e.g., In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, MDL No. 2323,
842 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (Mem.) (order transferring and consolidat-
ing cases for pretrial proceedings) (anticipating lawsuits against NFL and Riddell
that claims Riddell Study was “worthless”).
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to reduce concussions, was brief.334  Initially, the court held that the
advertisement for the Riddell Revolution Youth helmets was literally
false.335  Consequently, the court should have followed the injunc-
tion issued in Bracco, in which the defendant was ordered to for-
mally correct the literally false statement.336  Following Bracco, the
court should have enjoined Riddell to correct its misstatement in
the rush mailer.337  Although the statement had already been cor-
rected internally, the false perception was never corrected with the
public.338
Secondly, and more importantly, the court failed to recognize
the impossibility of the burden it ascribed to Schutt of demonstrat-
ing, conclusively, that design differences between the Riddell hel-
mets affected their ability to reduce concussions.339  Schutt showed
that the design differences “can” affect a helmet’s ability to “re-
duce” a concussion, but it could not have met the court’s standard
of “conclusive” proof because scientists do not know how, precisely,
to prevent concussions in contact sports.340
It is now commonly known that these traumatic brain injuries
are caused by sudden impacts that send the brain crashing against
the skull.341  Although the NOCSAE helmet standard, which both
Riddell and Schutt use to orient their helmet manufacturing, does
not have a concussion component, research has indicated that cer-
tain measures may reduce concussions; one example was the more
334. See Riddell, Inc., v. Schutt Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 975 (W.D.
Wis. 2010) (analyzing alleged falsity of Riddell’s advertisements that used study in
connection with helmets other than Revolution helmet).
335. See id. at 975-76 (referring to statement that wearers of Riddell Revolu-
tion Youth helmets were 31% less likely to suffer concussion than traditional hel-
met wearers and concluding that “the study did not involve Youth helmets, so the
statement that it did is literally false”).
336. See Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d
384, 397 (2009) (ordering “an injunction and damages for post and future correc-
tive advertising . . . to prevent future violations of the Lanham Act”).
337. See id. (issuing injunction).
338. Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (finding injunction inappropriate because
Riddell “already removed the reference to ‘Youth’ helmets from the rush mailer
and there is no suggestion they intend to use that language”).
339. See id. at 976 (finding fault with Schutt’s “general assertions that design
differences to areas like the shell or the face guard can change concussion
results”).
340. See Schwarz 10/21/10, supra note 13 (asserting biochemists are “unsure R
of how to prevent concussions” in football).  Definitive concussion prevention is so
elusive because the brain can crash against skull “through a wide range of forces,
some arriving straight to the head and others suddenly rotating it.” Id.  Thus, it is
difficult to adequately accommodate and defend against such varied threats.
341. See What is a Concussion, supra note 90 (defining concussion); Schwarz R
10/21/10, supra note 13 (noting uncertainty of how concussions occur). R
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rounded facemask design of the Riddell Revolution, and more pad-
ding along the sides of the helmet.342  Considering these facts and
the findings of the Riddell Study, it is reasonable to conclude that a
helmet that does not provide the precise protection of the Revolu-
tion would not prevent concussions with the same effectiveness.
The court’s treatment of the second group of advertisements,
those which were directed to age groups outside of the Riddell
Study sample, determined that they were not literally false because,
while the advertisements were misleading, they were not literally
false.343  The court reasoned that Riddell’s advertisements stated,
simply, that the concussion study showed decreased concussion
rates, without mentioning, or limiting, its application to the sample
population.344
This rationale ignores important policy considerations.  Ini-
tially, it ignores the policy provided in McNeil and Zeneca.345  Addi-
tionally, it ignores the ultimate goal of protecting consumers from
harm by parsing words in its meticulous analysis of “misleading”
and “literally false.”346
Both the McNeil and Zeneca courts understood this policy.347
The McNeil court noted that the danger of the “overly broad” claim
that Listerine was “as good as” floss was the effect it might have on
consumers.348  The court reasoned that consumers suffering from
342. See Schwarz 10/21/10, supra note 13 (“Helmet standards have not kept R
up with modern football.”) (quoting “industry insiders”); see also Anderson, supra
note 15 (describing Riddell’s facemask design feature, intended to “deflect some R
hits rather than absorb them,” thought in previous helmets to contribute to inci-
dence of concussion).  For a further discussion of concussion-related design differ-
ences, see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. R
343. Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 977 (discussing advertisements intended for
age groups other than high school students).
344. See id. (concluding that “[b]ecause the study showed decreased concus-
sion rates, the advertisement claims are not literally false”).
345. See McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 251-52 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (finding studies did not prove products’ equivalent universal effectiveness,
but instead indicated comparable effectiveness “only against plaque and gingivitis
in individuals with mild to moderate gingivitis” because study samples were limited
to individuals with mild to moderate gingivitis); Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,
No. 99-1452, 1999 WL 509471, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 19, 1999) (noting “disservice”
to affected women of allowing advertisements of Evista as breast cancer-reducing
drugs when claim had not been conclusively demonstrated).
346. See Riddell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 978, 979, 980 (differentiating between “mis-
leading” and “literally false”).
347. See McNeil, 351 F. Supp. 2d. at 251 (describing policy of not misleading
affected consumers); Zeneca, 1999 WL 509471, at *19 (noting policy of not mislead-
ing public regarding “highly significant” drugs).
348. See McNeil, 351 F. Supp. 2d. at 251 (illustrating consumer protection
goal).
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severe mouth disease might be misled into believing they were pro-
tecting themselves by using Listerine, when studies had not demon-
strated Listerine’s comparable effect on individuals with severe
mouth disease.349  Further, in Zeneca, the court justified its limita-
tion on claims that Evista had been shown to reduce the risk of
breast cancer by considering the “disservice” this would be to “the
millions of women who fear the disease.”350
In Riddell, the court did not consider the broader ramifications
of its decision.  The court could have noted the “risk compensation
effect” that “better” protective equipment provides, which describes
the typical reaction to improved safety gear: an increase in the riski-
ness of behavior, but it did not.351  Additionally, the court could
have drawn parallels to Zeneca by acknowledging the growing aware-
ness and fear of concussions, but it did not.352  Instead, the court
treated Schutt’s counterclaims on summary judgment, applying a
purely legal analysis.353  Had the court permitted the parties to in-
troduce evidence of the effect of claims on consumers, or the medi-
cal dangers of overly broad claims about equipment, the holding
might have been different.
3. Injury: To Whom?
The court found that Schutt failed to prove competitive harm
or injury.354  Under the Lanham Act for false advertising, to prove
that a statement is literally false, a plaintiff must also show actual or
likely injury occurring as a result of the statement, “either by direct
diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by a loss of good will
that is associated with its products.”355  The court applied the legal
principles properly here; Schutt failed to demonstrate competitive
349. See id. (“[C]onsumers who suffer from severe gingivitis or periodon-
titis . . . may be misled by the ads into believing that Listerine is just as effective as
floss in helping them fight plaque and gingivitis, when the studies simply do not
stand for that proposition.”).
350. Zeneca, 1999 WL 509471, at *19 (quoting Eli Lilly’s internal instructions
about Evista and providing another example of importance of protecting
consumers).
351. See Lehrer, supra note 59 (describing “risk compensation effect”).  For a R
further discussion of the risk compensation effect, see infra notes 356-362 and ac- R
companying text.
352. See, e.g., Dell’Antonia, supra note 8 (reporting on “Football and the Fear R
of Concussions”).
353. See Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963, 981 (W.D.
Wis. 2010) (dismissing Schutt’s counterclaims on summary judgment).
354. See id. at 980 (dismissing Schutt’s counterclaims on summary judgment).
355. Hot Wax, Inc., v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B)).
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harm, and was therefore barred from recovery under the Lanham
Act.356
However, assuming, as the court found, that Riddell’s rush
mailer advertising the Youth helmet was literally false, the policy rea-
sons for finding against Riddell outweigh Schutt’s failure to demon-
strate competitive harm.  By condoning the perpetuation of
advertisements claiming a specialized anti-concussion helmet,
proven to “reduce the incidence of concussions,” the court implic-
itly effectuated the risk compensation phenomenon.
Moreover, the court missed an opportunity to send a message
to all leagues and affiliates that have been, and will increasingly be,
affected by further discoveries of the dangers of concussions.357
The point was not that Schutt failed to prove injury from Riddell’s
false statement; rather, the point was that youths might have seen
the flyer, convinced their conscientious parents to buy the helmet,
and proceeded to make headfirst tackles under the belief that they
were wearing an anti-concussion helmet.358  By dismissing the coun-
terclaims on summary judgment, the court never considered the
broader implications of Riddell’s advertisement, and therefore
failed to provide for the protection of youths.359
VI. IMPACT
You ever been in a car crash?  Done bumper cars?  You know when
that hit catches you off guard and jolts you, and you’re like, what the
hell?  Football is like that.  But ten times worse.  It’s hell.360
The days of football players taking big hits, sniffing smelling
salts, and running back onto the field may finally be over.361  Con-
356. See id. (providing plaintiff must demonstrate advertisement is literally
false and has caused injury for recovery under Lanham Act).
357. See Belson, supra note 187 (entitling article “For N.F.L., Concussion Suits R
May Be Test for Sport Itself” and describing “multifront legal challenge to . . .game
itself”); Loverro, supra note 187 (reporting “Maxwell v. NFL Case Could Hit League R
Hard”); Wise, supra note 4 (noting “[NFL]’s concussion policy and its culture R
change, expressing regret for generations of coaches and players”).
358. See Lehrer, supra note 59 (stating “every year, we get more and more R
parents showing up with some fancy helmet and telling us this is the one their kid
has to use” due to alleged concussion-reduction capabilities).
359. See, e.g., Frommer, supra note 59 (requesting FTC look into “helmet R
claims” and writing that “issues involving serious health concerns—especially those
for children and young adults—are a ‘high priority for the commission’”) (quot-
ing FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz).
360. Wiedeman, supra note 1 (quoting Kris Jenkins, recently retired NFL de- R
fensive lineman).
361. See Sauser, supra note 6 (describing “significant rule changes” enacted in R
2010-2011 season in response to “greater awareness of head injuries,” including
more serious penalties and fines for helmet-to-helmet and defenseless player hits).
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cussion awareness has grown tremendously in recent years.362  Foot-
ball, undoubtedly, is a sport of “hit, hit, hit,” but its true impact on
those who play is largely unknown.363  The existence of the Riddell
Study—notwithstanding its limitations—and concussion-oriented
helmets demonstrate how prominent this recent expansion of con-
cussion consciousness has become.364  On the other hand, these ef-
forts may symbolize the efforts of Riddell and other similarly
situated parties, such as the NFL, to direct concussion-related re-
search, selectively and misleadingly disseminate the results of con-
cussion studies, and attempt to protect themselves from the
seemingly imminent liability that such parties face.365
The Riddell court chose to decide the case on the basis of legal
reasoning alone, and did not consider the weight that this concus-
sion consciousness carried.  Perhaps the fact that the District Court
was able to do this without accounting for the public policy con-
cerns of football and the associated health risks shows just how far
concussion consciousness has come since the 2010 decision.366  In-
deed, in the three years since Riddell was decided, efforts to develop
a strategy to decrease the risk of brain injury from contact sports
have increased dramatically.367  The focus has been on rule changes
and better equipment, yet it is generally acknowledged that equip-
362. See Leibowitz, supra note 331 (stating “concussions in sports . . . have R
received heightened scrutiny recently in both the media and in Congress, with
many statistics suggesting the number of concussions has increased significantly”).
363. See generally Greg Bishop, In Year of Hut, Hut, Hut, the 49ers Hit, Hit, Hit,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/sports/foot-
ball/for-49ers-defense-its-hit-hit-hit.html (stating San Francisco 49er’s slogan has
become “hit everything, hit anything, hit hard, hit first, hit often”).
364. See Schwarz 10/27/07, supra note 1 (“Contemporary helmet manufactur- R
ers have made a point of improving protection against concussions.”).
365. See, e.g., In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, MDL No. 2:12-
02323 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (Compl.) (suing NFL for allegedly concealing health threats
of playing professional football and Riddell for making inadequate helmets and
exaggerating protection provided by Revolution models); see also Helyar, supra
note 102 (noting Riddell’s $336,000 investment in UPMC project “aimed at dem- R
onstrating that the Revolution reduced concussions”).
366. See Leslie Leuke, Comment, High School Athletes and Concussions: More
Than a Game at Stake, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 483, 485 (2011) (attributing recent public-
ity “to former sports players’ reports of post-concussion difficulties and new studies
that have rebutted the presumption that because athletes seem to recover from
concussions so rapidly, concussions’ long-term effects are minimal”).
367. See State Legislation, THE CONCUSSION BLOG, http://theconcussionblog.
com/state-legislation/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (listing thirty states enacting
youth concussion laws between 2009 and 2012, and nine states with bills pending);
Cailyn M. Reilly, The NCAA Needs Smelling Salts When It Comes to Concussion Regula-
tion in Major College Athletics, 19 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 245, 260-61, 278-79 (2012) (dis-
cussing concussion management policies in professional sports leagues and several
NCAA member conferences).
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ment, alone, cannot solve the problem.  In fact, it is extremely un-
likely that any helmet can ever prevent concussions; certainly, “no
current helmet . . . or other piece of equipment can significantly
prevent concussions from occurring.”368
While the answer to stopping brain injury in contact sports re-
mains unclear, it is clear that a future court decision on these or
similar concussion-related legal issues will have to incorporate the
broader policy concerns surrounding concussions in its analysis.369
In particular, when the Eastern District of Pennsylvania hears In re
NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, in which Riddell has been
named a co-defendant, the court must consider how the concussion
enlightenment affects Riddell’s liability for exaggerating the protec-
tion that its helmets provide.370 In re NFL Players’ does not make
any Lanham Act claims against Riddell, but many of the claims in
the complaint are based on the UPMC study, its flaws, and the exag-
gerated advertising that ensued, which were at issue in Riddell.371
In conclusion, a future court should find that because of the
catastrophic long-term health effects of concussions—many of
which have come to light in the three years since Riddell was de-
cided—Riddell will be held liable for disseminating favorable re-
sults from flawed studies that ostensibly support its claims about the
effectiveness of its helmets at preventing concussions—but are ob-
jectively exaggerated and inaccurate—and failing to warn consum-
ers—candidly and adequately—about the risks of traumatic brain
injury inherent to contact sports that no helmet can ever eliminate.
The court should ground its ruling in two important public poli-
cies: first, the policy of preserving the mental health of amateur and
professional athletes over the economic gains of helmet manufac-
turers, and, second, the public interest in acknowledging the link
368. Lehrer, supra note 59. R
369. See, e.g., In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, No. 2:12-03337,
MDL No. 2323, 2012 WL 5212950 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2012) (Trial Pleading) (incor-
porating policy concerns of head trauma into complaint). See also NFL Head Inju-
ries Draw Public Concern, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-
2019/WashingtonPost/2012/06/07/National-Politics/Polling/release_91.xml?
uuid=z058LrCoEeGw96SQqoz3hw (last visited April 29, 2013).
370. See In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, MDL No. 2323, 842
F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (Mem.) (order transferring and consolidating
cases for pretrial proceedings, anticipating consolidation of NFL brain injury law
suit in Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
371. See, e.g., NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, 2012 WL 5212950 at
*76–80 (pleading facts relevant to causes of action against Riddell and claiming
that “the Riddell Defendants do not acknowledge a link between repeat concus-
sions and later life cognitive problems” and “the Riddell Defendants have never
warned Plaintiff or retired players of the long-term health effects of concussions”).
55
Reilly: Where is Concussion Litigation Headed?  The Impact of Riddell, In
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS207.txt unknown Seq: 56 14-JUN-13 14:39
572 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 517
between repeat concussions and later cognitive problems so that a
long-term collaborative solution can eventually be reached.
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